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Illuminating Innovation: From Patent
Racing to Patent War
Lea Shaver*
Abstract
Patent law assumes that stronger protection promotes
innovation, yet empirical evidence to test this “innovation
hypothesis” is lacking. This Article argues that historical case
studies hold unique promise to provide an empirical foundation
for modern patent policy. Specifically, this Article uses the history
of patents surrounding the light bulb to examine a recently
articulated theory of “patent racing” as a justification for patent
protection. Thomas Edison’s experience confirms that Mark
Lemley’s racing model has substantial descriptive merit. Yet this
case study also reveals the limits of the patent racing model.
Looking past the initial finish line of patent filings to later
litigation, the competition looks less like a race and more like a
war.
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The Article then proposes a new model of “patent warfare”
resembling the board game Risk. In the game, competing parties
assemble strategic assets, then turn to battle their rivals for world
domination. Similarly, innovative technology companies assemble
patent portfolios—initially for defensive purposes in the context of
a dynamic and competitive field. As an industry matures,
however, dominant players convert their shields into weapons to
eliminate their competition. Just as nineteenth-century companies
in the early electrical industry battled to control the light bulb, a
new patent war is now emerging to control the smartphone. This
anticompetitive endgame diminished next-generation innovation
in electric light and now threatens the future of innovation in
mobile computing.
A new appreciation of patent warfare should prompt
increased skepticism of the “innovation assumption” at the heart
of patent law. Patent protection clearly provides short-term
benefits to innovation, but it also produces unanticipated longterm costs to competition and next-generation innovation. Further
empirical research is needed to ascertain whether the benefits
outweigh the costs or vice versa and what tweaks to the patent
system might allow us to continue to capture the benefits while
lowering the costs. In this continued effort, historical case studies
will prove particularly helpful because they permit insight into the
complex workings of patent law on an industry over a longer time
horizon, revealing not only the short-term benefits but also the
long-term costs.
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I. Introduction
More than a century after its introduction, the incandescent
light bulb remains the defining icon of invention. Elegantly
simple, this humble device was nonetheless a transformative
technology.1 Just as spreadsheet software drove demand for
personal computers and email clients drove demand for Internet
service, the incandescent lamp was the “killer app” that drove
demand for electricity.2 In the process, the light bulb paved the
way for every other electronic appliance, including the radio, the
television, and the personal computer. No less than the computer,
the light bulb revolutionized our world.
This Article sheds light on the role that patent law played in
the light bulb’s emergence. The story told here is not a
conventional tale of great inventors, bright ideas, and the
inevitable march of scientific progress. It is a story of corporate
maneuvering and high-stakes litigation, as Thomas Edison and
1. For greater discussion of the concept of “enabling technologies,” see
Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 606–13
(2005).
2. See ARTHUR A. BRIGHT, JR., THE ELECTRIC-LAMP INDUSTRY:
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FROM 1800 TO 1947 8–11
(1949) (explaining the importance of the incandescent lamp to the emergence of
an electrical supply system, scientific and public interest in electricity, the
radio, and economic growth through World War I generally). Edison himself
played a great role in developing and building out the technology and
infrastructure for electricity distribution. Of Edison’s patents related to electric
light between 1881 and 1883, only 37% were related to the light bulb. The
majority of his patents related to other elements of the electric power delivery
system, including voltage regulation and engine governors (24%), transmission
and distribution (14%), and dynamo design and operation (12%), among other
aspects. Paul Israel, Claim the Earth: Protecting Edison’s Inventions at Home
and Abroad, in KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
CONCEPTS, ACTORS AND PRACTICES FROM THE PAST TO THE PRESENT (Graham
Dutfield & Stathis Arapostathis eds., 2013) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Israel,
Claim the Earth] (on file with author).
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his competitors employed patents as weapons in their battle to
dominate the electrical industry. Although famous for his
workshop talents, Edison would be better understood as an early
Bill Gates, his business success built on a keen appreciation of
the power of aggressive intellectual property strategy and the
frailty of antitrust law.3
This story holds particularly important lessons for the
modern information technology (IT) industry, where an epic
patent battle is now underway.4 Although early incandescent
3. See generally WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT
CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE (2007)
(examining the antitrust case against Microsoft in the context of shifting
debates about antitrust law); see also Israel, Claim the Earth, supra note 2
(explaining that Edison used patents as part of a larger strategy to establish
industry dominance through his early work in the telegraphy industry,
strategically identifying certain technological features of the electrical system as
choke points for where to achieve “the commercial monopoly of the general
[electricity] distribution business”).
4. As this Article went to print in December 2012, Apple had recently won a
$1 billion judgment against Samsung for intellectual property infringement related
to smartphones and tablets running Google’s Android operating system. This
Apple–Samsung trial, completed in August 2012, is just one among dozens in a
broader pattern of transnational litigation. See generally Andy Baio, A Patent Lie:
How Yahoo Weaponized My Work, WIRED (Mar. 13, 2012, 3:44 PM),
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2012/03/opinion-baio-yahoo-patent-lie/ (last visited
Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Michael A.
Carrier, A Roadmap to the Smartphone Patent Wars and FRAND Licensing, CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2012, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2050743; Robert McMillan, How Apple and Microsoft
Armed 4,000 Patent Warheads, WIRED (May 21, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.
wired.com/wiredenterprise/2012/05/rockstar/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Marissa Oberlander, Martin Stabe
& Steve Bernard, The Smartphone Patent Wars, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2011,
5:43 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/de24f970-f8d0-11e0-a5f7-00144feab49a.ht
ml#axzz25KFyAXEL (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (“Patent wars are raging in the
smartphone industry. What began as Apple v Google Android conflict has
turned into a vast legal quagmire involving everyone from Amazon to ZTE.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Richard A. Posner, Why There
Are Too Many Patents in America, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2012, 10:20 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-toomany-patents-in-america/259725/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) [hereinafter
Posner, Too Many Patents] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Jessica E. Vascellaro & Evan Ramstad, Apple, Samsung Set Patent Talks:
Settlement Attempt Unlikely to Bear Fruit, WALL ST. J. (May 21, 2012, 9:59 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303879604577414832794580586.
html (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (“Chief executives . . . will meet in San
Francisco Monday in a court-directed session aimed at settling their
smartphone patent war. But a deal seems unlikely, people familiar with the
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light bulbs and modern smartphones are very different
technologies, they have much in common from the perspective of
patent strategy. Understanding the patent war over the light
bulb can help us understand what is at stake in the current war
over the smartphone.5
Edison’s lamp can also shed light on one of the most
challenging questions asked in patent scholarship today. Is
patent protection on the whole helpful or harmful to innovation?
And how might the law be tweaked to achieve an even better
balance between protection and competition? The light bulb can
illuminate these questions by testing existing theory and helping
to improve on it. For more than two centuries, U.S. patent law
has assumed that patents promote innovation.6 Yet for all the
profound impact that patent law has on industry and society, we
have little empirical evidence to test this “innovation
assumption.” In fact, there are good reasons to believe that
patents may also impede innovation by creating barriers to
competition.7 The assumption should more prudently be treated
as a hypothesis in need of empirical testing.
Part II of this Article argues that careful case studies,
particularly those drawn from history, may best advance our
understanding of patent law’s impact on innovation. The
remainder of the Article develops such a case study, focusing on
Thomas Edison’s efforts to market an incandescent light bulb.
Part III takes up a recently articulated theory of patent racing,
using the case study to test and refine the racing model. Part IV
explores the lessons of this case study for the innovation
hypothesis. Here, a new model of “patent warfare” is advanced,
which not only explains the experience of the early electrical

matter and others tracking the battle say.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
5. This insight becomes even more timely in light of Judge Posner’s recent
ruling in the Apple–Google litigation. See infra notes 183–84 and accompanying
text (discussing Judge Posner’s decision to dismiss the recent suit between
Apple and Motorola for lack of an adequate, acceptable remedy).
6. See generally BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND
COPYRIGHT LAW 60–103 (1967).
7. See infra Part II.A (discussing the economic and social costs of a patent
system).
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industry, but also reveals the high stakes of the new patent war
now breaking out in the smartphone industry.
II. Testing the Innovation Hypothesis
A. Patents and Innovation
For more than two centuries, the notion that patent
protection encourages technological innovation has remained the
conventional wisdom.8 In 1830, Anglo-American legal philosopher
Jeremy Bentham captured its essence: “In new inventions,
protection against imitators is not less necessary than in
established manufactures protection against thieves. He who has
no hope that he shall reap will not take the trouble to sow.”9 A
half-century later, the same notion is reflected as the popular
wisdom of industrial Americans in Mark Twain’s A Connecticut
Yankee in King Arthur’s Court.10 In this tale, a New England
8. This utilitarian argument has never been the only justification for
patent protection. Adam Mossoff has persuasively argued that normative
concepts of fairness, not expectations of economic benefit, have been a
significant—perhaps even primary—justification for patent protection since the
founding of America. See Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson
Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical
Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 954–59 (2007). For a recent and thorough
treatment of ethical justifications for intellectual property not relying on the
innovation assumption, see generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011). Of course, patent protection can also be
challenged on ethical grounds, including notions of human rights. See, e.g., Lea
Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 121, 122–28.
Nonetheless, the empirical assumption that patent protection will promote
technological progress finds expression in the U.S. Constitution, which provides
that Congress may offer inventors monopoly privileges on their inventions for
limited times “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. At the Constitution’s signing, a number of states were already
granting patents and some had done so even as British colonies. See BUGBEE,
supra note 6, at 57–103 (describing the early patent system in colonial America).
The true effect of this constitutional provision, then, was not to create a
governmental power to grant monopolies, but to establish this power as an
exclusively federal one, to be exercised by the legislative branch. See BUGBEE,
supra note 6, at 129–31 (explaining the establishment of a federal patent
system). Whether the provision also established meaningful limits on the term
of such monopolies is a topic that remains open to substantial debate.
9. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF REWARD 318 (1830).
10. MARK TWAIN, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR’S COURT (Oxford
Univ. Press 2008) (1889).
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mechanic from the 1880s travels back in time to Camelot, where
he becomes a valued advisor to the English king. On the subject
of technological innovation, Twain’s hero relates:
[T]he very first official thing I did, in my administration—and
it was on the first day of it, too—was to start a patent office;
for I knew that a country without a patent office and good
patent laws was just a crab, and couldn’t travel any way but
sideways or backwards.11

As an empirical matter, however, the benefits of patent
protection for innovation are far less certain. Scholarly
skepticism about the anticipated benefits of patent protection
also has deep roots.12 In the 1950s, the noted economist Franz
Machlup advised Congress:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible,
on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic
consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we
have had a patent system for a long time, it would be
irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to
recommend abolishing it.13

Fifty years later, noted scholar Richard Posner lamented that
economists have still not determined whether the benefits of
intellectual property protection outweigh the costs.14 Economists
11. MARK TWAIN, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR’S COURT 107 (1st
ed. 1889). Credit is due to Mark Adelman for leading me to Twain’s work. For a
more serious interview with Mark Twain suggesting that the Yankee hero’s
statement reflects Twain’s own beliefs rather than simply words thrust upon a
satirical strawman, see MARK TWAIN, MARK TWAIN: THE COMPLETE INTERVIEWS
295 (Gary Scharnhorst ed., The University of Alabama Press 2006) (using
historical evidence himself to suggest that patent protection encourages not so
much invention itself as the diligent perfection of invention into a commercially
practical technology). Twain was also a patent holder. See Improvement In
Scrap-Books, U.S. Patent No. 140,245 (filed May 7, 1873) (issued June 24, 1873)
(disclosing a self-pasting scrap-book).
12. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
899, 901–03 (2002) (analyzing parallels between the Victorian-era British
movement to abolish patents and contemporary debates).
13. FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM: STUDY OF
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS 80 (1958).
14. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and
Economics Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 59 (2005) (“Unfortunately,
economists do not know whether the existing system of intellectual property
rights is, or . . . whether any other system of intellectual property rights would
be, a source of net social utility, given the costs of the system and the existence
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and legal scholars have recently devoted great theoretical
attention to clarifying the ways in which patent protection may
inhibit innovation, as well as incentivize it.15
of alternative sources of incentives to create such property.”).
15. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 35–41 (2006) (analyzing the
digital environment with the “understanding that markets based on patents or
copyrights involve a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency”); MICHELE
BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 206 (2008)
(offering a litany of economic arguments against patents and copyrights and
concluding that “the patent system destroys productive capacity, generates
useless and damaging monopoly, and last but not least, humiliates and destroys
decent and humble geniuses”); JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT
FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK
145–46 (2008) (“It is important to emphasize that our evidence suggests that
patents today constitute a brake on innovation, not a roadblock . . . . [O]ur
evidence implies that patents place a drag on innovation. Without this drag, the
rate of innovation and technological progress might have been even greater,
perhaps much greater.”); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION
AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2 (2004) (arguing that innovation is
threatened by the uncertainty created by a patent system that provides poor
notice of property boundaries); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 11–24 (2003); Dan L.
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1597–99 (2003); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating
Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1437, 1465–73 (2010) (surveying contexts in which intellectual
production flourishes without intellectual property as well as reasons to believe
that intellectual property may still be necessary to provide optimal incentives);
Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1559, 1561 (2006) (reviewing Jaffe and Lerner’s Book Innovation
and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System Is Endangering Innovation
and Progress, and What To Do About It and arguing that “[w]ith some
modification, [the authors’ suggested reforms] could go a long way toward
healing the system”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley,
Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1719, 1721–24 (2003) (noting that questionable patent litigation is frequently
being used as cover for collusion between market competitors); Adam B. Jaffe,
The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation
Process, 29 RES. POL’Y 531, 531–32 (2000); Mark A. Lemley, Property,
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1058–59 (2005);
Christopher Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents,
91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 103 (2006); Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving
Information Paradigms and the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 861, 871–79 (2009) (arguing that changing dynamics of innovation are
poorly served by international regimes imposing substantive standards of
intellectual property protection); Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust
Policy for Innovation 2–4 (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 397,
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Patent law and policy, however, continue to operate on the
assumption that patents not only incentivize greater innovation,
but that the patent incentive is substantial such that innovation
would be greatly diminished if the incentive were removed or even
weakened.16 By and large, the field of patent scholarship also
treats this assumption as presumptively correct, while
acknowledging that future research might one day call it into
question. This willingness to assume—at least for the time being—
that patents work as intended has the same practical effect as an
evidentiary presumption: it shifts the burden of proof onto the
challengers of the conventional wisdom. There are virtues to
adopting this assumption. One such virtue is enabling patent
scholars to focus productively on calibrating less-entrenched
aspects of patent doctrine and on suggesting reforms that may be
implemented in the near future.17
Embracing this assumption too fully, however, carries an
unacceptable risk. Patent law is a tremendously influential aspect
of modern economic regulation.18 What if its central assumption is
wrong? So far we have justified the substantial social costs of
patent protection—litigation costs, anticompetitive effects, higher
prices for consumers, barriers to adoption of new technologies—on
the basis that these sacrifices are worthwhile in order to achieve
faster innovation. If patent protection offers much fewer benefits
for innovation than widely supposed, the law is imposing these
substantial costs needlessly. And if patent protection actually has
a net negative impact on innovation, the real costs to economic
growth may be appalling in scale. Because the risks of being
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670197.
16. Indeed, evidence suggests that patent law’s reliance on the innovation
assumption has, if anything, increased in recent years. See Gaia Bernstein, In
the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2257, 2259–60 (2010)
(documenting an increasing use of the phrase “innovation” in intellectual
property opinions beginning in the 1980s).
17. See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful
Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 531, 532–35 (2012) (surveying the mixed
empirical support for the innovation hypothesis without taking sides and
proceeding to focus on a more politically open question: What emphasis should
patent doctrine place on disclosure as a central policy goal?).
18. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 15, at 6–7 (comparing the
economic impact of tangible property law to economic incentives potentially
created by patent laws).
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wrong are so great, the innovation assumption should more
prudently be treated as the innovation hypothesis, in need of
further empirical testing.
B. Case Study as Methodology
A major challenge for researchers seeking to test the
innovation hypothesis is the complexity of the phenomenon.
Changes in patent policy take time to play out in the marketplace
and affect different industries in different ways.19 At the
macroeconomic level, it can be very difficult to separate out
impacts due to changes in patent policy from those due to other
causes.20 Cross-national comparisons are further complicated by
the trend toward harmonization of patent law, which limits
opportunities for empirical evaluation of differing regimes.21 Even
defining “innovation” as a quantifiable outcome has proven
elusive.22 These challenges make it difficult to reliably measure
patent law’s impact through large-scale quantitative analysis.
19. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 15, at 1576–78 (explaining how
innovation and therefore the impacts of patent policy differ based on the
industry studied).
20. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 15, at 11 (“Many interrelated
factors can influence R&D spending, innovation, and the resulting social
welfare, so it is difficult to disentangle these to determine the independent
influence of patents.”).
21. Economist Petra Moser has creatively approached this problem by
analyzing evidence of innovation predating the modern trend toward
international harmonization of patent law. See Petra Moser, How Do Patent
Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World’s Fairs,
95 AM. ECON. REV. 1214, 1231–33 (2005) (concluding that, because patent
protection appears to enhance innovation in some industries but impede it in
others, variance in patent regimes across countries may result in optimal
global results by encouraging the development of comparative advantages).
22. In 2006, the United States Department of Commerce launched a
special advisory committee to help it develop metrics for measuring the
innovativeness of the United States’ economy. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ECON.
& STATISTICS ADMIN., INNOVATION MEASUREMENT, TRACKING THE STATE OF
INNOVATION IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (2008), available at http://www.
esa.doc.gov/Reports/innovation-measurement-tracking-state-innovation-americaneconomy. The Measuring Innovation in the 21st Century Economy Advisory
Committee’s first meeting in February 2007 highlighted some of the challenges of
measuring innovation. See Brian Wingfield, Measuring Innovation, FORBES (Feb.
23, 2007, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/businessinthebeltway/2007/02/22/
innovation-commerce-companies-biz-washington-cx_bw_0223innovate.html (last
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In my first article, I explored some of the problems inherent
in macroeconomic measures of innovation, particularly the
problematic reliance on rates of patent filing as the measure of
innovation.23 Rather than relying on numerical data, the article
suggested that careful case studies are likely to prove more
enlightening at the present stage of research.24 An empirical case
study steps back from the overwhelming web of data to pick up
the thread of a single “case,” which might be the life of a
particular patent, technology, company, or industry.25 The
visited Nov. 14, 2012) (describing the first meeting of the committee) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also NAT’L SCI. FOUND., DIV. OF SCI.
RES. STATISTICS, NSF 07-306, ADVANCING MEASURES OF INNOVATION: KNOWLEDGE
FLOWS, BUSINESS METRICS, AND MEASUREMENT STRATEGIES (2007), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf07306/pdf/nsf07306.pdf (concluding that much
further research will be necessary to develop reliable innovation metrics).
23. See Lea Bishop Shaver, Defining and Measuring A2K: A Blueprint for
an Index of Access to Knowledge, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 235, 264–65
(2008) (noting that rates of patent applications and grants reveal more about
the ease and advantages of obtaining a patent, rather than accurately reflecting
underlying rates of innovation).
24. See id. (suggesting that researchers focus on “high-value innovation” or
narrow the focus of their study to one field rather than attempt to measure
innovation across an entire society).
25. The empirical “case study” has no necessary relationship with the “case
method” widely used in legal research and education. Literature on case studies
as an empirical research methodology has been careful to distinguish its subject
from the quite different use of cases as a teaching tool in law and business. See,
e.g., ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 4–5 (4th ed.
2009) (describing a “teaching case” as one designed to establish a framework for
discussion and debate among students and noting that the focus on his work is
on the use of case studies as a research method). In contrast to the case method,
the case study need not take a particular legal dispute or judicial opinion as its
focus of inquiry. Of course, the “case” that is the object of empirical study might
be a legal case, such as the Supreme Court’s hearing of the Incandescent Lamp
Case, 159 U.S. 465 (1895). But the “case” might also be a patent (such as
Edison’s ’898 Patent), a technology (the light bulb), a patentee (Thomas Edison),
a firm (General Electric), or a sector (the early electrical industry). Any specific,
complex, functioning thing may be a “case” for study. See ROBERT E. STAKE, THE
ART OF CASE STUDY RESEARCH 2 (1995) [hereinafter STAKE, CASE STUDY
RESEARCH]. My interest in understanding how patent law influences
technological innovation led me to define my case around one technology—the
early light bulb. Many different legal disputes, patents, patentees, and firms
influence innovation in any particular field of technology. Therefore, focusing on
any one particular opinion, patent, inventor, or company would likely narrow
the inquiry too much and miss essential aspects of the larger innovation
dynamics. A concrete technology (such as the light bulb or the smartphone)
appears to be the simplest unit of investigation that allows us to seek answers
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researcher follows the path of that one subject to see where it
leads and attempts to interpret its lessons.26 A leading
articulation of the case study methodology in the social sciences
proposes that “case studies are the preferred method when
(a) ’how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, (b) the investigator
has little control over events, and (c) the focus is on a
contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context.”27 These
three conditions accurately capture the challenges associated
with asking how patent law impacts technological innovation.
To be sure, a case study of any one technology has only
limited utility for answering our larger questions about
innovation. The dynamics of the particular technology selected
may not be representative of all sectors or even of the general
trend. Multiple data points are needed. It should also be
acknowledged that case studies are fundamentally acts of
interpretation.28 To guard against investigator bias, these
interpretations should be subject to peer review, public debate,
to questions about technological innovation and diffusion, without hiding the
complex operations of patent law in the real world.
26. Within the substantial social scientific literature employing and
commenting on case study methodology, some researchers prefer case studies
because of normative commitments that achieving objective, accurate
explanation of complex social phenomena is unattainable or undesirable. From
these researchers’ point of view, there is no “truth” in social science, only
“interpretation.” See Robert E. Stake, Case Studies, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 435, 439 (Norman K. Denzin & Donna S. Lincoln eds.,
2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Stake, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH] (describing some of the
criticisms of case study research regarding their value to generalizability). This
is not my point of view, nor is it my motivation for adopting this methodology.
Quite to the contrary, the present study assumes that there is a correct answer
to the question, “Does patent protection promote technological innovation?” and
that social science can help us find that correct answer. Of course, the correct
answer is unlikely to be a simple “yes” or “no.” Rather, the accurate answer to
this question is likely to be complex, to be filled with caveats, and to inevitably
have some margin of uncertainty. The correct answer is likely to be: “Under
certain circumstances, yes, patent protection does appear to promote innovation;
and under other circumstances, no, patent protection appears to be
counterproductive.” Careful case studies can help illuminate these complex
dynamics and help to form provisional answers, which may in turn be further
tested and verified through quantitative analysis.
27. YIN, supra note 25, at 13.
28. See, e.g., STAKE, CASE STUDY RESEARCH, supra note 25, at 8 (“According
to one highly respected writer on qualitative studies, Fred Erickson, the most
distinctive characteristic of qualitative inquiry is its emphasis on
interpretation.”).

ILLUMINATING INNOVATION

1903

and independent studies of other cases, a phenomenon referred to
in the case study literature as “triangulation.”29 Over time,
however, the collective work of many scholars may build a robust
body of case studies, which could provide a strong empirical basis
to support or call into question key predictions and assumptions
about the impact of patents on innovation. Even before this
critical mass is reached, individual case studies can offer a
helpful reality check on our theoretical models of how patent
incentives work. Do theoretical predictions that seem to make
sense in the abstract actually fit with what can be observed in the
historical record? Or is there a significant gap between theory
and fact, at least in the particular cases available to date?
The present work builds upon a body of empirical case
studies that have already been developed by patent scholars
looking at a number of modern technologies. For example, Lisa
Ouellette has examined the disclosure function of patents in
spreading scientific knowledge through the nanotechnology
sector.30 Graham, Merges, Samuelson, and Sichelman have
drawn findings about the role of patents in assisting startups,
drawing on surveys of more than one thousand high-tech
entrepreneurs in sectors ranging from biotechnology to
software.31 Samuelson and Scotchmer have examined the
economic impact of reverse engineering in the semi-conductor and
software industries.32 Health economist Heidi Williams has used
interviews and statistical analysis to document a negative impact
29. See id. at 111–15 (describing the triangulation protocols to “increase
credence in the interpretation” and “to demonstrate commonality of an
assertion”).
30. See, e.g., Ouellette, supra note 17, at 552–71 (drawing on a survey of
more than 200 nanotechnology researchers and case studies of selected
nanotechnology patents to evaluate the impact of patents on scientific
disclosure).
31. See Stuart J. H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the
Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1255, 1255 (2009) (“We offer description and analysis of the 2008 Berkeley
Patent Survey—the first comprehensive survey of patenting and
entrepreneurship in the United States—summarizing the responses of 1,332
early-stage technology companies founded since 1998.”).
32. See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics
of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1595–1626 (2002) (describing the
results of the authors’ study of the economic impact of reverse engineering in
the semi-conductor and software industries).
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on downstream innovation for gene sequences covered by
intellectual property.33 Fiona Murray and colleagues documented
a similar negative impact in a comparison of laboratory mouse
varieties subject to differing intellectual property restrictions.34
The above case studies each have a quantitative component,
focusing on a particular set of data to answer particular questions
about their cases. These studies illustrate the point that the
empirical case study need not be purely qualitative.
A more recent trend in patent scholarship is to explore
historical, as well as current, case studies.35 Thus, Gerard
Magliocca has harvested lessons from the behavior of patent
33. Heidi Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence
from the Human Genome (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
16213, 2011), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/colloquia/
innovationpolicy/ECM_PRO_070944; see also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P.
Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption, Inventing Around, and the
Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1365–70 (2011) (surveying
empirical research on the effect of gene patents on medical innovation and
drawing lessons for the patentability of genetic correlations).
34. See Fiona Murray et al., Of Mice and Academics: Examining the Effect
of Openness on Innovation 4–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 14,819, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14819 (determining
that research using mice species subject to greater intellectual property
restrictions resulted in less “downstream” innovation than research using lessrestricted species).
35. There is also a larger body of historical work on patent law not
employing the case study approach. See generally, e.g., B. ZORINA KHAN, THE
DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920 (2005) (providing a historical overview of
the development of patent and copyright law in America and its impact on
economic development); CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1600–1800 (1988) (examining trends
in patenting and innovation as well as offering an intellectual history of the
concept of invention in this time period); Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel
of Interest’ from the ‘Fire of Genius’: Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830–1930,
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1998) (examining the development of law respecting
ownership of employee inventions during the 19th and 20th centuries in
America); Moser, supra note 21 (using exhibition data to examine the impact of
patent laws on innovation); Brad Sherman & Leanne Wiseman, Fair Copy:
Protecting Access to Scientific Information in Post-War Britain, 73 MOD. L. REV.
240 (2010) (discussing the impact of library copying provisions on the
development of copyright law in post-war Great Britain); Kara Swanson, The
Emergence of the Professional Patent Practitioner, 50 TECH. & CULTURE 519
(2009) (tracing the historical roots of the modern patent bar); Steven Wilf, The
Making of the Post-War Paradigm in American Intellectual Property Law, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 139 (2008) (reviewing the expansion and development of the
scope of intellectual property law in America since World War II).
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trolls with regard to nineteenth century agricultural machinery.36
Adam Mossoff has delved into patent thickets surrounding the
early sewing machine industry.37 Kara Swanson uncovered the
hidden dimensions of “the corset case” to offer a gendered
perspective on patent law.38 And Christopher Beauchamp picks
up the telephone as an object of cultural and legal disputes over
inventorship.39
So far, historical scholars have not typically focused their
attention on the innovation hypothesis, and innovation scholars
have not generally favored historical case studies.40 Yet historical
case studies may be critical to testing patent law’s innovation
hypothesis. The unique advantage of a historical case study is
that the passing of time allows researchers to observe both shortterm and long-term results. This is crucial because the full
impact of patent protection plays out over several decades. In the
near term, incentives are perceived, a technology is developed,
patents are issued, and products come to market. In the longer
term, the new industry matures, litigation ensues, the firstgeneration patents expire, and second-generation innovation
takes place. When studying cutting-edge technological sectors,
our analysis is necessarily limited to the near term; the longerterm effects remain in the future, out of sight. This shortened
horizon may introduce a systematic blind spot in our
36. Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and
the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1808–14 (2007).
37. Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket:
The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 166–70 (2011).
38. Kara W. Swanson, Getting a Grip on the Corset: Gender, Sexuality, and
Patent Law, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 57, 59–62 (2011).
39. Christopher Beauchamp, Who Invented the Telephone?: Lawyers,
Patents, and the Judgments of History, 51 TECH. & CULTURE 854, 855–66, 877–
78 (2010) [hereinafter Beauchamp, Who Invented the Telephone] (examining
how patent law influenced the legal and cultural notions of who invented the
telephone); see also Christopher Beauchamp, The Telephone Patents: Intellectual
Property, Business, and the Law in the United States and Britain, 1876–1900, 9
ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 591 (2008) (using a case study of the early telephone
industry in the United States and Great Britain to explore interactions between
business strategies and national legal regimes).
40. Indeed, historical inquiry comes with challenges for the researcher
interested in assessing the impact of patent law on innovation. Quantitative
data may not have been recorded and might be impossible to gather now.
Participant observation and interviewing are similarly unavailable as
methodologies.
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understanding of patent law’s true impact. The benefits of patent
protection are visible immediately in the form of enhanced
research and development spending, cutting-edge technologies,
and new products on market. The long-term costs to competition,
access, and next-generation innovation may take place later, out
of sight.41
Taking a historic case study such as the light bulb allows us
to examine the impact of patent law in the fullness of time—not
just at the initial stage of research and development, but
throughout the term of protection and past the expiration of firstgeneration patents. This greater perspective can allow
researchers to observe long-term dynamics that would have
remained hidden in the future when studying a more current
technology. In the case of the light bulb, these long-term
dynamics included massive litigation,42 the consolidation of a
previously competitive industry,43 and a half-century lull between
when incandescent-light technology was first patented and when
it finally became widely accessible to the American public.44
Perhaps it should come as no surprise, then, that patent scholars
centrally concerned with the innovation problem have heavily
relied on the very limited historical research already at hand.45
41. See Bernstein, supra note 16, at 2311 (distinguishing the first step of
innovation from the second step of diffusion and concluding that intellectual
property law has been insufficiently concerned with the latter).
42. See, e.g., HAROLD C. PASSER, THE ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERS 1875–
1900: A STUDY IN COMPETITION, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, TECHNICAL CHANGE, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 151–55 (1953) [hereinafter PASSER, THE ELECTRICAL
MANUFACTURERS] (describing the litigation that ensued surrounding the
patenting of the light bulb).
43. See id. at 155–62 (describing the consolidation of the incandescent lamp
industry following the upholding of Edison’s light bulb patent).
44. See generally DAVID E. NYE, ELECTRIFYING AMERICA: SOCIAL MEANINGS
OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY, 1880–1940 (1992) (tracing the history of electricity’s
spread across America from its initial development in the early 1880s to its
broad spread to ordinary Americans only in the 1930s and 1940s).
45. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 15 (discussing patents as a form
of property right and concluding that patents fail as property in rewarding
innovators and encouraging investment in innovation); BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra
note 15 (analyzing the impact of intellectual monopolies created through patents
and copyrights on the economic motivations for innovation); Mark A. Lemley,
The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2012) [hereinafter Lemley,
Sole Inventor] (examining the problem of simultaneous or near-simultaneous
invention as it relates to patent law theory).
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History remains the best evidence available to us, in a world
where controlled experiments are impossible. This promising
body of evidence deserves more careful and extensive
investigation.
C. Law and the Light Bulb
Many different technologies might have been the focus of an
attempt to historically examine the innovation hypothesis. Why
choose the light bulb? Robert E. Stake has distinguished three
approaches to case study research: “intrinsic, instrumental, and
collective.”46 First, a researcher may choose to undertake a case
study for intrinsic interest: not to understand a general
phenomenon or build theory, but because the case itself is of
inherent interest.47 Alternatively, a case may be explored with
the primary goal of gaining an understanding of larger questions
removed from the particular instance—the instrumental case
study.48 My aim in undertaking this case study is decidedly
instrumental. My research is driven by the desire to understand
how patent law impacts technological innovation and diffusion.
Many different technologies could have served that instrumental
purpose; the light bulb offered simply one convenient starting
point. In the future, several thoughtfully selected inventions
might be explored through a collective case study.49
For many Americans, however, the case of Thomas Edison
and the light bulb holds substantial intrinsic interest. People are
interested in knowing more about the invention of the light bulb,
for its own sake. Choosing this particular case thus offered me a
vehicle to explore the innovation hypothesis, with the hope of
finding a wider audience. A second advantage of the enduring
intrinsic interest in the light bulb and Thomas Edison is that a
46. Stake, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH, supra note 26, at 438.
47. See id. at 437 (noting that the case is undertaken not “because the case
represents other cases or because it illustrates a particular trait or problem, but
because, in all its particularly and ordinariness, [the] case itself is of interest”).
48. See id. (“The case is of secondary interest, it plays a supportive role,
and it facilitates our understanding of something else.”).
49. See id. (defining the collective case study as an instrumental study
extended to several cases, which are selected as a sample to be representative of
a broader class of phenomena the researcher wants to understand).
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substantial body of scholarship already exists on this case. This
Article draws significantly on that existing scholarship to look for
answers to a previously neglected research question. The
availability of a wealth of primary and secondary materials on
this case also means that researchers who share my interest in
the innovation hypothesis have access to the same resources.
Others may interpret these materials independently, critique my
conclusions,
and
offer
alternative
explanations:
such
“triangulation” is an important check on case study work that
seeks to answer an empirical question.
Discussion of Edison’s work seems an almost inescapable
element of any treatise on innovation.50 Yet the Great Inventor
has so far attracted only a little attention from legal scholars.51
The Supreme Court’s opinion in the Incandescent Lamp Patent
case52 is familiar to many patent attorneys, students, and
scholars. It is excerpted in several patent casebooks and makes
regular appearances in law review footnotes.53 Yet the case’s
50. See, e.g., HAROLD EVANS WITH GAIL BUCKLAND & DAVID LEFER, THEY
MADE AMERICA 151–71 (2004); JONATHAN S. FEINSTEIN, THE NATURE OF CREATIVE
DEVELOPMENT 565 (2006); ANDREW HARGADON, HOW BREAKTHROUGHS HAPPEN:
THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT HOW COMPANIES INNOVATE 249 (2003); THOMAS P.
HUGHES, AMERICAN GENESIS: A CENTURY OF INVENTION AND TECHNOLOGICAL
ENTHUSIASM 517 (2004); INVENTIVE MINDS: CREATIVITY IN TECHNOLOGY 345
(Robert J. Weber & David N. Perkins eds., 1992); ROBERT W. WEISBERG,
CREATIVITY: UNDERSTANDING INNOVATION IN PROBLEM SOLVING, SCIENCE,
INVENTION, AND THE ARTS 261–75 (2006); JOHN ZIMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 356 (2000).
51. For the exception that proves the rule, see Barak Y. Orbach,
Prizefighting and the Birth of Movie Censorship, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251,
251 (2009) (examining extensively Edison’s role in adopting self-regulation as a
mode of content censorship in the early motion picture industry). Orbach’s
interest was censorship and freedom of expression, yet his article’s insight into
Edison’s business approach to motion picture technology is interesting from an
intellectual property perspective as well. For instance, Orbach traces Edison’s
tendency to publicly exaggerate the progress of an invention and his inability to
accurately predict the profitability of a technology at the time of its invention.
See id. at 275−76 (recalling that Edison often used the press to promote
uncompleted inventions without foresight into the financial benefits of such
publicity). Edison also receives several paragraphs of attention in recent works
by Mark Lemley and Brian Love; these works are discussed in detail in Part III
of this Article.
52. Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465 (1895).
53. The case quickly became known by the subject matter of the patent,
rather than the parties’ names. See, e.g., WALTER MALINS ROSE, NOTES ON THE
UNITED STATES REPORTS: A BRIEF CHRONOLOGICAL DIGEST OF ALL POINTS
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historical context, the litigation’s implications for the
electrification of America, and the case’s potential larger lessons
for innovation policy remain only dimly unappreciated. Indeed,
the case name itself is a misnomer. There is no single patent
corresponding to the incandescent lamp. Thomas Edison himself
took out more than 100 patents on technical components of the
incandescent lamp;54 his assistants and competitors also held
many light bulb patents. Indeed, the patent at the center of the
Supreme Court case was not Edison’s but that of a rival. More
often, we invoke Thomas Edison and his light bulb in passing—
treating Edison as an icon, rather than as a subject of inquiry.55
DETERMINED IN THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT 776 (1901) (referring to
the case by the name of “Incandescent Lamp Patent” and summarizing the
holding as “the “[p]atent is void, where application is so vague that independent
experimentation is necessary to construe it”); Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on
Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and Biotechnology’s
Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J.
109, 138 (2011) (citing “the venerable Incandescent Lamp Patent case” as
indicative of the genus-species rule of patent claiming); Mark A. Lemley, The
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989,
1002 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Economics of Improvement] (referring to the
Incandescent Lamp Patent case as “a celebrated case” illustrating the principle
that patent claim scope should be limited to embodiments actually enabled by
the disclosure); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of
Equivalents and Claiming the Future, Part II (1870-1952), 87 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 441, 446 nn.121–27 (2005) (crediting the case with
establishing the modern standard for enablement of claim scope, laying to rest
earlier doctrine on pioneering patents).
54. See Israel, Claim the Earth, supra note 2.
55. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 16, at 2258 (“We adore genius and
admire creators. We celebrate the achievements of Thomas Edison, and the
extraordinary talent of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart.”); John S. Leibovitz,
Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251, 2251–53 (2002)
(using a slightly fictionalized account of the Edison-Swan invention race as a
“paradigmatic patent parable” to illustrate the drawbacks of a winner-take-all
approach to patent rights); Corey McCaffrey, The Virtues of Virtual Marking in
Patent Reform, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 367, 367 (2011) (“The world is full of
reminders that we are surrounded by inventions. When we see a light bulb, we
remember Thomas Edison.”); Michael J. Meurer & Katherine J. Strandburg,
Patent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of Nonobviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 547, 551−52 nn.12−15 (2008) (using Edison’s light bulb as a familiar
invention to illustrate the argument that higher nonobviousness standards push
inventors to pursue more ambitious projects); see also Lemley, Sole Inventor,
supra note 45, at 710 (“Any elementary-school student can recite a number of
canonical American invention stories. Thomas Edison invented the light bulb
from his famous home laboratory in Menlo Park, New Jersey.”). Lemley’s article
does not end with the icon, however, but goes on to explore Edison’s story in

1910

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1891 (2012)

This Article seeks to go further, examining the invention,
patenting, marketing, and litigation of the incandescent light
bulb through the close lens of patent racing theory.
Before beginning this deeper inquiry, however, a brief
introduction is in order. Many of us were taught as children that
Thomas Alva Edison invented the light bulb.56 The full story is
more complicated. A primitive light bulb had first been
demonstrated more than seventy years before Edison’s work
began.57 In the intervening decades, crucial improvements in
vacuum technology and electricity generation were developed
that made electric light a newly promising technology.58
Beginning in 1878, Edison led a team of engineers who worked
together to produce one of the first commercially practical
systems of interior lighting.59 This team, however, had serious
competition in the laboratory and the marketplace.60 The
competition was so intense, in fact, that for many years after
greater depth, calling into question the iconic image. See id. at 722−23 (“It
seems clear, however, that Edison did not ‘invent’ the lightbulb in any
meaningful sense.”). Lemley also uses the Incandescent Lamp Patent case as an
illustration of the doctrine of enablement in the context of follow-on innovation.
See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 53, at 1002−03 (discussing
the court’s decision to invalidate Sawyer and Mann’s patent infringement claim
against Edison on the grounds that Sawyer and Mann’s patent for the use of any
vegetable fiber as a filament did not preclude Edison from making further
investigation using bamboo).
56. A number of works aimed at children present Thomas Edison as an
archetype of the heroic inventor See, e.g., LAURIE CARLSON, THOMAS EDISON FOR
KIDS: HIS LIFE AND IDEAS: 21 ACTIVITIES (2006); INEZ NELLIE MCFEE, THE STORY
OF THOMAS A. EDISON (1922); WILLIAM H. MEADOWCROFT WITH AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL
NOTE BY MR. EDISON, THE BOY’S LIFE OF EDISON (1911); FRANCIS ROLT-WHEELER,
THOMAS ALVA EDISON (1915).
57. See BRIGHT, supra note 2, at 36 (“One of the first demonstrations of
electrically induced incandescence was made in 1802 . . . .”).
58. See id. at 38−42 (discussing the contribution energy advancements and
vacuum developments had on the ultimate success of incandescent lighting).
59. See ROBERT FRIEDEL & PAUL ISRAEL WITH BERNARD S. FINN, EDISON’S
ELECTRIC LIGHT: BIOGRAPHY OF AN INVENTION, 4−5 (1986) [hereinafter FRIEDEL &
ISRAEL, ELECTRIC LIGHT].
60. At the exhibitions of the International Electrical Congress in Paris in
1881—held after Edison had filed several patents in the field but before he had
his first paying customers—incandescent lamps were displayed by Swan, LaneFox, Maxim, and Edison. THOMAS P. HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER:
ELECTRIFICATION IN WESTERN SOCIETY, 1880–1930, at 50 (1983) [hereinafter
HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER].
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light bulbs began to be widely manufactured and sold, it
remained unclear who had won. Even today, British
schoolchildren are taught that Joseph Swan, not Thomas Edison,
won the race to invent the light bulb.61 Once electric light was
ready for commercialization, many companies competed with
Edison’s in the marketplace.62 Compared to his rivals, however,
Edison was particularly successful in litigating his portfolio of
patents related to electric light technology. Edison leveraged his
patent portfolio and courtroom successes to obtain mergers or
market sharing agreements with most of his competition.63 A
fifteen-year litigation campaign advancing claims based on a
number of patents produced a stunning consolidation of a
previously competitive market for light bulb manufacture.64 By
1910, General Electric—the successor to Edison’s electric light
companies—would control 97% of all light bulbs sold in the U.S.
market.65 The remainder of this Article examines both the early
patent race and the later patent war in greater detail.
III. Dynamics of Inventive Races
One contribution historical case studies can make is to test
existing theoretical models of patents’ roles in incentivizing
innovation. Part III of this Article uses the case study of the light
61. This version of history is reflected in the Wikipedia entry for Joseph
Swan. See Joseph Swan, WIKIPEDIA (Sept. 12, 2012, 4:18 PM),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Swan (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (“He is
most famous for inventing an incandescent light bulb before its independent
invention by the American Thomas Edison.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); see also KENNETH R. SWAN, K.C., SIR JOSEPH SWAN 15–39
(1946) (denouncing at the outset “the somewhat pretentious and all-embracing
claims which have from time to time been advanced on Edison’s behalf” and
providing a detailed account of Swan’s own claim to inventorship of the
incandescent light bulb).
62. See BRIGHT, supra note 2, at 73 tbl.X (listing the “principal pioneer
manufacturers of carbon-filament lamps in the United States”).
63. See id. at 87−101 (illustrating Edison’s use of his patent to bring
injunctions against competitors, forcing many of them to close down or
consolidate their businesses).
64. See id. (describing the “corporate purchases, consolidations, and
regulations,” mostly triggered by Edison’s legislation tactics, that ultimately
resulted in two companies controlling the electrical-goods industry).
65. Id. at 147–48.

1912

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1891 (2012)

bulb to test, critique, and refine one theory of “patent racing,”
which has been offered as one account of how patent protection
may incentivize faster innovation.66 As articulated by Mark
Lemley, patent racing theory centers on an underappreciated fact
that proves problematic for other theories of patent-motivated
innovation: most inventions are not breakthroughs at all, but
ordinary engineering work that achieved its goal just a short time
before the rest of the competition.67
In using the light bulb case study to test this theory, this
Article draws upon a vast secondary literature describing the
development of incandescent light. These historical accounts,
however, predate patent racing theory, tend to discuss patents
and patent law only tangentially, and are generally authored by
writers more interested in Thomas Edison as a personality than
in theoretical questions of innovation policy. The process of sifting
through this literature is thus one of searching for needles in a
haystack—finding those snippets of relevant information here
and there in the corpus, historical asides that now enjoy a second
life as data points completely unintended by their original
documenters. In all cases, I have made a point to critically
question whether the original author’s account of the historical
“facts” should be treated as reliable or not. As much as possible,
this account relies only on data that can be confirmed through
reference to more than one source.
Held up to the empirical light of Edison’s bulb, Lemley’s
patent racing model proves to have substantial merit as a
descriptive account. The racing metaphor captures a significant,
66. For a fuller picture of variations on the theory of patent racing and
related models offered to explain how patents incentivize faster innovation, see
John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439,
440–47 (2004) (“[T]he race to claim patent rights becomes a race to diminish the
patentee’s rents by dedicating the invention to the public sooner.”); Mark F.
Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law & Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305,
305–10 (1992) (identifying that the case law suggests that “patent protection
applies only to inventions that signal large possibilities for improvement
relative to the rent that a patent gives to the inventor”) (emphasis omitted);
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 265–67 (1977) (arguing that the patent system increases the output
from resources used for technological innovation).
67. Lemley, Sole Inventor, supra note 45, at 710 (discrediting the “canonical
story” of the individual inventor and suggesting that new technologies are
oftentimes invented simultaneously by independent teams).
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and often overlooked, reality about the dynamics of innovation in
the shadow of patent law and is helpful to understanding the
development of the light bulb. In its present form, however,
patent racing theory also has weaknesses. A closer look at the
light bulb suggests that the better metaphor for understanding
technological innovation may be neither a sprint nor a marathon
but the board game Risk. Patent law does not provide clearly
defined finish lines and criteria for judging winners, but rather a
set of strategic resources for waging longer-term corporate
battles.68 Ultimately, the experience of the light bulb leaves me
less optimistic than Lemley that patent racing will fare any
better as a normative justification for patent protection. Rather, a
fuller understanding of the inventive race to control the light bulb
should leave us even more skeptical of the innovation hypothesis.
A. The Theory of Patent Racing
In The Myth of the Sole Inventor, Mark Lemley explores the
underappreciated dynamic of “simultaneous invention” and the
problems it poses for the conventional economic justifications of
patent protection.69 In case after case, Lemley’s article illustrates
that multiple inventors working on the same technological
problem have arrived at the same solution at nearly the same
time.70 The archetypal case here is the telephone: Alexander
Graham Bell and Elisha Gray reportedly filed their competing
68. I am indebted to Robin Feldman at the UC Hastings College of the Law
for the invitation to think of patent rights not as property claims in the
traditional sense but as chips to be presented at the bargaining table when
shares of ownership in a technology are eventually being resolved. I first
encountered this presentation of patent law as an audience member when she
gave a plenary presentation at the 2009 Intellectual Property Scholars
Conference, and it greatly shaped my thinking about this project and the
present Article. That presentation has now evolved into an excellent book, see
ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW (2012). My theory of patent warfare
builds on Professor Feldman’s view of patent strategy, although the metaphor I
have chosen—war, rather than bargaining—reflects my view of the dynamic as
less collaborative and more destructive than her own.
69. See Lemley, Sole Inventor, supra note 45, at 710−11 (arguing for a
change in patent theory to accommodate the reality of simultaneous invention).
70. See id. at 735 (concluding, after a historical analysis, that it is “rare” for
one inventor to develop a “wholly new product that no one else achieved at
roughly the same time”).
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patent applications on the very same day.71 Simultaneous
invention may also take a less obvious form, wherein a single
product builds on incremental inventive contributions by so many
different parties that it truly has no identifiable inventor.72
The overwhelming presence of simultaneous invention,
Lemley argues, calls into question the dominant theoretical
justifications for patent protection.73 If invention is the product of
ordinary engineering work rather than extraordinary labors of
genius, why do we award such an enormous prize to the party
that achieved it first, if only by a few days?74 Lemley then
proposes an alternative theory that might better justify patent
protection, which begins from the reality of simultaneous
invention, rather than from the myth of the sole inventor.75 This
“patent racing” theory proposes that patent incentives accelerate
innovation by increasing the stakes of the race to invent.76 All
parties in the competition know that the first-place winner will
take away a great prize, and the runner-up may be shut out
completely. The enhanced competition these heightened stakes
engender, Lemley suggests, may motivate greater investment of
resources and thus accelerate the overall pace of innovation.77
The Myth of the Sole Inventor actually includes the light bulb
among its historical examples of simultaneous invention, along
the incremental model.78 Lemley correctly characterizes Edison’s
71. See id. at 710, 720–22, 751.
72. See id. at 714−15 (claiming that the incremental process of invention
often leads to recognition of the “first person to make one significant step in the
chain” and ignorance of “the developments that precede and follow it”).
73. See id. at 737 (“The overwhelming presence of both independent
invention and incremental contribution calls the basic incentive story into
serious question.”).
74. See id. at 752 (“If two or more putative investors invest that money in
research and development in an effort to beat each other to the market, all but
the first to invent will have wasted that money . . . .”).
75. See id. at 750 (considering a patent system that recognizes the
importance of cumulative innovation).
76. See id. at 753−54 (describing the benefits of a patent race, including the
quicker progress of inventions, the possibility of a wide variety of approaches to
solving a problem, and the improved quality of inventions that a deadline might
encourage).
77. See id. at 753 (“[A] patent race should . . . cause inventions to be made
sooner than they otherwise would be . . . .”).
78. Id. at 722−23.
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inventive contribution as “an incremental one: one in a long chain
of improvements.”79 Indeed, the contributions of Edison’s research
team took the form of a chain of improvements as well, with
multiple patents filed on various aspects of the light bulb and its
related technology as they were developed, ultimately building a
robust patent portfolio surrounding electric light technology. A
closer look at the development of the incandescent light bulb
reveals strong support for some aspects of patent racing theory,
and also suggests ways in which the framework requires
complication and revision.
B. Support for Patent Racing Theory
First, the support: Thomas Edison was clearly in an
inventive race. He had multiple contemporaneous rivals pursuing
the exact same inventive goal: a commercially viable light bulb.80
According to Conot, at least thirty-one U.S. Patents in the area of
incandescent light had already been granted and not yet
expired.81 Edison thus began work on the incandescent light bulb
in 1878, at a time when the field was already populated by
competing inventors and prior patents.82 This competition
continued after Edison entered the field, and multiple parties
filed important patents in the United States and other
jurisdictions.83 Edison ultimately began large-scale electric light
79. Id. at 723.
80. See BRIGHT, supra note 2, at 44 (listing six other inventors working
towards the development of incandescent electric lighting).
81. See CHARLES BAZERMAN, THE LANGUAGES OF EDISON’S LIGHT 247 (1999)
(“[I]n the 15 years before Edison was granted his first patent for incandescent
light, 31 patents had already been granted in that area . . . .” (citing ROBERT E.
CONOT, A STREAK OF LUCK 214 (1979))).
82. See FRIEDEL & ISRAEL, ELECTRIC LIGHT, supra note 59, at 7–8 (“As early
as 1841, Frederick De Moleyns, an Englishman, received a British patent for an
incandescent lamp using both carbon and platinum. In 1845 an American, J.W.
Starr, not only patented two forms of incandescent lamp . . . but also traveled
around England giving exhibitions and promoting his inventions.”); see also
William Sawyer, Elec. Lamp, U.S. Patent No. 235,459 (filed Sept. 20, 1880)
(issued Dec. 14, 1880) (claiming a particular mechanism for fitting an electric
lamp to a bracket).
83. See BAZERMAN, supra note 81, at 247 (“[I]n the 15 years before Edison
was granted his first patent for incandescent light, 31 patents had already been
granted in that area . . . .” (citing ROBERT E. CONOT, A STREAK OF LUCK 214
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service in New York City in September 1882.84 By that point,
several other companies were also mass-producing electric light
bulbs—and wielding their own patent portfolios.85
Offering further support for the validity of Lemley’s
metaphor, these parties also perceived themselves to be in a
race. They were acutely self-conscious about their competition,
sought out every available bit of information about the other
teams’ progress, and were generally quite concerned about who
seemed to be ahead at any given moment.86 So were their
(1979))).
84. Edison’s Electric Light, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1882, at 8.
85. See, e.g., PASSER, THE ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERS, supra note 42, at
191 (“Under [Hiram] Maxim, the [United States Electric Lighting Company]
began production of incandescent-lighting plants for isolated use in 1880.”). In
August 1881, various light bulb manufacturers, including the Swan, Maxim,
and Lane-Fox teams, in addition to Edison’s, had demonstrated their wares at
the Exposition Internationale de l’Électricité (Paris Exhibition). See Letter from
Otto A. Moses, Edison Emp. (Aug. 26, 1881), in 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS ALVA
EDISON: ELECTRIFYING NEW YORK AND ABROAD 144–45 (Paul Israel et al. eds.,
2007) [hereinafter PAPERS OF EDISON VOL. 6] (assuring the receiver of the letter
that the Edison exhibit outshone all the rest). By 1882, several systems
competed with Edison’s. See Letter from Charles Mott to Arnold White (July 5,
1882), in PAPERS OF EDISON VOL. 6, supra, at 584–85 (referring to competing
providers of incandescent light installations, including Siemens, Swan, “and
others”); see also Letter from Frank J. Sprague, a member of Edison’s research
team, to Edward Johnson, another Edison employee (Sept. 21, 1882), in PAPERS
OF EDISON VOL. 6, supra, at 655–57 (“Crompton informed me privately that the
[Swan] Company were turning out 15,000 lamps a week, and I am inclined to
believe him.”); BAZERMAN, supra note 81, at 247–48 (discussing the patents
wielded by other manufacturers).
86. This was true from the first months of Edison’s work on incandescent
light. See, e.g., Letter from E.W. Griffiths, counsel retained by Edison, to
Thomas A. Edison (Oct. 30, 1878), in 4 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS A. EDISON: THE
WIZARD OF MENLO PARK, 1878, at 657–58 (Paul Israel et al. eds., 1998)
[hereinafter PAPERS OF EDISON VOL. 4] (“Mr. Lowrey directs me to send you a few
hurried notes of a conversation had with Mr. Sawyer this morning.” The
enclosure then details particular technological accomplishments in which
Sawyer claims to have anticipated Edison’s team.) The very next day, Edison
directed his attorney to conduct a thorough patent search. Letter from T.A.
Edison to Lemuel Serrel (Oct. 31, 1878), in PAPERS OF EDISON VOL. 4, supra, at
658 (“Please make out a list of all US patents from the earliest ages to the
present time on Electric light and send them for me [sic] Want them right off.”).
Edison’s concern to keep apprised of his competition continued as the endeavor
moved from the research stage to commercialization. A report from an Edison
employee gives a sense of the competition research being conducted:
The Swan Company is pushing forward, and in this connection let me
say that Edison must not abate the work on the lamp, Swan is
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investors.87 The progress made by the team of William Edward
Sawyer and Albon Man posed particular problems for Edison.88
Between 1880 and 1883, the competitors were embroiled in a
hard-fought priority battle at the U.S. patent office over which
team had been first to achieve a key insight.89 The dispute went
against Edison, and the issuance of the Sawyer and Man patent
in 1885—along with Westinghouse’s entry in the industry—set
the stage for a decade of extensive and expensive litigation.90
Given the existence of other competitors, one very plausible
interpretation of this history is that Edison’s participation in this
race merely accelerated the arrival of a commercially practical
light bulb. Gas lighting was an extremely lucrative industry,91
and arc electric lighting was already finding commercial

making continual advance, and has recently commenced making
lamps by a new process, which are the finest lamps I ever saw. They
are not yet public, but Crompton, who is now one of the Swan
Directors showed me one. . . . This new lamp is claimed to have 100
ohm resistance hot, and it can easily be increased, and to require but
.6 of an empere, and 36 vol-tamperes, for 20 candle power. I think
perhaps this is a little high, but is a wonderfully fine lamp, and I
think can be made more cheaply than Edison’s, and has fully as much
life. He is making other lamps of 40 candle and has recently made
lamps of 300 ordinary candle power.
Letter from Frank J. Sprague, in PAPERS OF EDISON VOL. 6, supra note 85, at
657. See also SWAN, supra note 61, at 19 (describing Swan’s response to the
growing publicity afforded to the competing systems of electric lighting).
87. See, e.g., FRIEDEL & ISRAEL, supra note 59, at 26–29 (describing growing
pressure from Edison’s investors at the earliest stages of his research to
demonstrate some advantage over existing teams of researchers)
88. See generally BAZERMAN, supra note 81, at 247–49 (describing Edison’s
practice of resolving conflicting patent claims over the incandescent light by
combining forces with the businesses holding competing patents, but noting that
this was not successful universally, and the Sawyer Man competition was
particularly vexing).
89. See id. at 248–57 (detailing the patent interference proceedings and
later litigation between the Edison and Sawyer-Man teams).
90. See id. at 248 (discussing the beginning of multiple infringement suits
involving Edison and his competitors); infra Part IV.A (same); see also Israel,
Claim the Earth, supra note 2, at 20 (“Edison and his company used their strong
patent position to enforce licensing agreements with customers of both central
and isolated stations and to attack competitors. By 1885, they were involved in
nearly one hundred patent office proceedings and lawsuits involving electric
lighting.”).
91. BRIGHT, supra note 2, at 20.
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application.92 The immense market potential of electric light in
the household context was widely realized. For electric engineers
of the day, the challenge of “subdividing the electric light”—
adapting it for domestic use—was an obvious goal, attracting
significant attention and effort even before Edison entered the
field.93 From the perspective of market incentives and of
technological groundwork already laid, a commercially practical
light bulb may have been a near inevitability.
Edison’s participation, however, probably greatly increased
the fervor of this race—at least between his 1878 entry and 1881,
when Edison moved from Menlo Park to New York to oversee
commercial introduction. Prior to Edison’s entry, limited
resources were being invested in pursuit of the incandescent light
bulb. The leading American competition was the Sawyer–Man
team.94 William Sawyer was a journalist turned inventor funded
primarily by New York lawyer Albon Man, who organized the
Electro-Dynamic Light Company for this purpose.95 The company
had allocated $4,000 to Sawyer’s research between March and
June 1878.96 Edison’s talent for raising venture capital would
produce a much bigger war chest: nearly $130,000 in research
funds were directed to his electric lighting work between 1878
and 1881.97 Edison’s entry into the field not only attracted
significant new investments to his own team, but also motivated
increased investments to his competitors. In September 1878, the
precise month that Edison threw his hat into the ring, the
Sawyer–Man company set up a second workshop.98
Indeed, Edison’s entry may have been the defining event that
truly kicked off the race for the light bulb as a serious one. When
Edison filed his first light bulb patent in September 1878, he gave
92. See, e.g., id. at 32 (“Arc lighting was making commercial as well as
technical progress in this country [the United States] by the time incandescent
lighting appeared on the scene in 1880.”).
93. HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER, supra note 60, at 31–32.
94. PAUL ISRAEL, EDISON: A LIFE OF INVENTION 188 (1998) [hereinafter
ISRAEL, A LIFE OF INVENTION].
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. Adjusted for GDP deflation, Edison’s $130,000 in research expenses
from 1878 to 1881 translates to more than $2.5 million in current dollars. Id.
98. Id.
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an interview to the New York Sun in which he claimed
definitively—if not accurately—to have solved the problem of
incandescent light.99 A brief excerpt serves to illustrate the effect:
Mr. Edison says that he has discovered how to make electricity
a cheap and profitable substitute for illuminating gas. Many
scientific men have worked assiduously in that direction, but
with little success. . . . It has been reserved for Mr. Edison to
solve the difficult problem desired. This, he says, he has done
within a few days . . . “I have obtained it through an entirely
different process from which scientific men have ever sought to
secure it. They have all been working in the same groove, and
when it is known how I accomplished my object, everybody will
wonder why they have never thought of it, it is so
simple . . . .”100

A few days later, Edison began financial negotiations for
investments.101 A letter privately assured one potential investor
that “all serious difficulties have been overcome and there is
every reason to believe that [Edison] has discovered the means of
giving an electrical light suitable for every use at a vastly reduced
cost as compared with the cost of gas.”102
Edison thus claimed to not only be ahead of his competition
in the inventive race for incandescent light, but to have already
won. Stock prices in gas companies tumbled, indicating that at
least some people took these claims seriously.103 More
sophisticated investors, however, knew better than to take
Edison’s initial claims at face value.104 They suspected that the
solution was not yet in hand and even doubted whether Edison
99. Edison’s Newest Marvel, N.Y. SUN, Sept. 16, 1878, in THERESA M.
COLLINS & LISA GITELMAN, THOMAS EDISON AND MODERN AMERICA: A BRIEF
HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 83–85 (2002).
100. Id. at 83.
101. BAZERMAN, supra note 81, at 10; FRIEDEL & ISRAEL, supra note 59, at
14.
102. Letter from G.P. Lowrey, Edison’s representative in investment
negotiations, to Hamilton McKay Twombly, representative of potential investor
William H. Vanderbilt (Oct. 1, 1878), in PAPERS OF EDISON VOL. 4, supra note 86,
at 658.
103. See FRIEDEL & ISRAEL, supra note 59, at 23 (“[I]n early October the
news from America caused a panic in gas shares in London, where Edison’s
reputation for wizardry was unequaled.”).
104. See id. at 14 (“[T]he story was read by some of the Wall Street
moneymen who had already learned to be wary of Edison’s technical genius.”).
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would ultimately be the first to achieve it.105 Indeed, the
technique Edison claimed in U.S. Patent No. 214,636,
“Improvement in Electric Lights,” was ultimately unsuccessful.
The line of research reflected in this first patent filing was
discarded entirely and the design never made it into an actual
product.106 Edison would not be able to publicly demonstrate a
successful bulb—utilizing a different underlying technology—
until more than a year later, at the end of December 1879.107
Although Edison’s claims were premature, they could not be
ignored. Lemley suggests that patents may increase the
incentives in a race as both a carrot and a stick. From the carrot
perspective, runners race because they believe that they will
finish first and obtain a patent reward.108 From the stick
perspective, runners are motivated to go faster because they fear
that their competitors will win, obtaining patent rights that shut
them out of a lucrative market.109 Looking at the race for the light
bulb, the stick dynamic seems to be strongly in play. Edison’s
1878 claims represented a threat that he would solve the problem
of the light bulb in the near future. That threat seemed uniquely
105. Potential investors in Europe asked to see a working model of the
invention, which Edison promised to send through his agent George Gourad. See
Letter from Thomas A. Edison to Theodore Puskas (Oct. 5, 1878), in THERESA M.
COLLINS & LISA GITELMAN, THOMAS EDISON AND MODERN AMERICA: A BRIEF
HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS, at 85–86 (2002) [hereinafter A BRIEF HISTORY]. Two
days later, however, a telegram from Gouraud himself to Edison vainly pleaded
for a demonstration or some helpful detail of the breakthrough that could be
publicly shared to bolster confidence before panicked British investors moved to
support a rival system. See Telegram from George Gourad to Thomas A. Edison
(Oct. 7, 1878), in A BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 105, at 86. Edison cabled back
advising Gourad to “let them go ahead,” as he could not yet provide the
requested proof. Id.; see also FRIEDEL & ISRAEL, supra note 59, at 14 (describing
the hesitancy of investors in financing Edison’s new invention).
106. BAZERMAN, supra note 81, at 186–89. Bazerman deftly provides a clear
explanation of the technique claimed by Edison in this first patent, which even a
non-engineer can understand, as well as reproducing the patent specification
and claims, as issued. Id.
107. See e.g., id, at 183–85; FRIEDEL & ISRAEL, ELECTRIC LIGHT, supra note
59, at 111–14; ISRAEL, A LIFE OF INVENTION, supra note 94, at 187–88.
108. See Lemley, Sole Inventor, supra note 45, at 755 (describing the
different motivations for inventors to move quickly in developing their
invention).
109. See id. (describing the role a patent race can play as a “stick” by
motivating inventors to move quickly to avoid “the risk of losing a race and
being excluded from competition in that market”).
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credible coming from Edison because of his public reputation as
an inventor and because of his obviously passionate commitment
to this particular technological challenge.110
Edison’s entry into the race on these terms helped to create
an air of inevitability surrounding incandescent lighting. The
perfection of the technology suddenly seemed close at hand.
Investors scrambled to pick sides and stake claims in what now
appeared poised to be an important new industry.111 Gas lighting
companies stood to come out as losers no matter which team won
the race. This made it all the more important for them to throw
some of their great resources into backing a winning team in
order to hedge their existing investments. The race was
definitively on and gathering momentum. The key points of
Lemley’s theory—the prevalence of simultaneous invention, the
role of patent protection in raising the stakes, and the power of
competition to motivate increased investments in research and
development—all find support in the race to perfect the light
bulb.
C. Problems for Patent Racing Theory
Despite all this support in the historical record, Lemley’s
theory of patent racing has been vehemently disputed by business
professor John Howells and his co-author, Ron D. Katznelson.112
These critics specifically take issue with Lemley’s use of the light
bulb as an example of incremental invention.113 They argue that
Edison’s contribution in fact “unlocked the field,” that it cannot
be placed on par with contributions by any other inventor, and

110. See FRIEDEL & ISRAEL, supra note 59, at 29 (suggesting that initially,
Edison’s chief asset was self-confidence, largely shared by the world at large).
111. See id. at 14 (examining the various investors who decided to finance
Edison’s operation, including individuals associated with the telegraph and gas
companies).
112. See John Howells & Ron D. Katznelson, A Critique of Mark Lemley’s “A
Myth of the Sole Inventor” 4–5 (Sept. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://bitly.com/Lemley-Critique (on file with author).
113. See id. (disputing Lemley’s claim that Edison was not a sole inventor by
highlighting the distinct strengths of Edison’s invention in contrast with those
of his competition).
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that Edison was deserving of a “pioneer” patent.114 My own
examination of the light bulb case puts me on the side of Lemley
rather than his critics. The central mistake made by Howells and
Katznelson is to treat judicial opinions and patent claims as
reliable evidence of who really did what.115 These legal documents
emphatically assert that Edison’s inventive contributions were
without peer. Such assertions, however, should be treated with
great skepticism. The historical claims about Edison’s
contributions, which Howells and Katznelson present as fact, are
better understood as a deeply mythologized “narrative of
invention” that Edison himself forged in preparation for
litigation.116 The model of incremental innovation more
accurately fits the true history of the light bulb’s development.
Contrary to Howells and Katznelson’s position, my concern
with Lemley’s patent racing theory is that the model may not go
far enough to reflect the reality of incremental innovation.
Lemley describes simultaneous invention as existing in two
models.117 The first model is when two inventors are working on
the same technology, and the contest is to see who will produce it
first.118 Lemley offers the telephone as the archetype of a patent
race: two inventors almost literally racing to the patent office
door.119 But the second model is probably more common. This is
when the process of invention is characterized by roughly
114. Id. at 6. The concept of a “pioneer patent” was popular in American
patent doctrine at the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Proponents
argued that when an inventor had made a “pioneering” contribution to a new
field of technology, he should be entitled to broad claims covering not only the
specific embodiment they had produced but also later generations of the
technology that others developed. For a critique of this doctrine—and argument
as to its enduring relevance—see Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention
Doctrine, 90 N. CAROLINA L. REV. 379, 389 (2012).
115. See Howells & Katznelson, supra note 112, at 4–7 (describing the
reasons that Edison’s patent for the incandescent light was superior to his
competitors).
116. See generally Lea Shaver, Patents, Publicity, and the Myth of Invention
(2012) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Shaver, Myth of Invention] (on file
with author).
117. See Lemley, Sole Inventor, supra note 45, at 731 (“[I]nventions . . . are
in fact generally the products either of simultaneous independent invention or of
incremental development from multiple sources, or both.”).
118. Id. at 712–15.
119. Id. at 720–22.
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contemporaneous contributions by so many different parties that
it becomes impossible to declare any one true “father” of the
technology.120 The race for the light bulb, at least, best fits this
pattern of incremental innovation.121 Even in the case of the
telephone, the narrative of the race to the patent office may be
more a product of litigation stance than of the underlying reality
of technological development.122
If the pattern of incremental innovation is indeed the
prevailing one, as I suspect, we need a reconceptualization of
racing theory that deemphasizes the patent office door as the
finish line. Doing so, however, destabilizes the metaphor. Central
to the concept of a race is the existence of a clearly defined finish
line, at which point the winners and losers are declared based
upon a simple and objective measure of performance. Indeed, the
very purpose of the race as an athletic convention is to enable this
objectivity by clearly defining the terms of the contest in advance.
A political campaign also meets these two criteria of a traditional
race: a clearly defined endpoint (election day) and an objective
methodology for determining the winner (tabulating votes).
Inventive races, however, may not conform to this model. The
race for the light bulb, at least, lacked these two key
characteristics.123

120. Id. at 715–16.
121. For a comprehensive account of innovations in electrical lighting
between 1880 and 1890, well situated in their economic and political context,
see generally HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER, supra note 60.
122. See Beauchamp, Who Invented the Telephone, supra note 39, at 877
(highlighting the difficulty of “the question of where, on the continuum of
conceptualization,
experimentation,
‘reduction
to
practice,’
and
commercialization, the invention of the telephone should be rightly marked”).
123. The inventive race for the light bulb has one other similarity with
political races, however: the dynamics of self-fulfilling prophecies. In a political
campaign, contenders seek to create the perception that they are in the lead, in
order to win over those potential supporters who simply want to throw in their
lot with the likely winner. Edison thus cultivated the media and exaggerated his
own progress to discourage investors from backing his rivals. See FRIEDEL &
ISRAEL, supra note 59, at 13. Similar to a political campaign, impressions about
which inventive team is ahead can translate into additional resources helpful
for getting ahead, making such prophecies self-fulfilling. Mercifully, even the
longest political campaign finds its end within eighteen months, and a victor is
clearly anointed. Not so with an inventive race, in which it may take more than
a decade for courts to declare the winner.
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Indeed, this particular race was so closely and fiercely
contested that for many years—even years after light bulbs were
widely being manufactured in the United States—there was no
clear winner. Throughout the 1880s, multiple companies, each
holding patent portfolios from different inventive teams, claimed
strenuously that their champions had prevailed.124 Ultimately,
these conflicting claims had to be settled by the law.125 In doing
so, the patent office and the courts had to apply legal criteria that
are infinitely more complex and subjective than those commonly
used to judge athletic and political races. Courts also had to make
this determination, not immediately after the relevant finish line,
but many years later, upon an imperfect evidentiary record
developed by deeply interested parties. In one crucial trial, for
instance, Edison’s attorneys persuaded the judge that William E.
Sawyer had in fact never made the lamp claimed in the disputed
patent.126 Because ten years had passed between the claimed
experiments and the Incandescent Lamp Patent trial, Mr. Sawyer
was no longer alive to testify personally as to the events.
Beyond mere problems of evidence, Robin Feldman argues
persuasively that subjectivity and indeterminacy are inherent
features of patent interpretation.127 In Feldman’s words,
“[p]atents cannot possibly delineate the boundary of an inventor’s
rights because those rights will be established in relation to
products that have yet to be created at the time of the patent
grant.”128 Patent lawyers face the daunting task of choosing
words to capture the essence of a technology that by definition
124. See, e.g., BAZERMAN, supra note 81, at 247–48 (describing the uncertain
and overlapping claims of ownership over the light bulb technology and the
increasingly competitive production of light bulbs based on these various
patents).
125. See id. at 248–50 (describing the interference battle between Edison
and the Sawyer-Man team at the patent office in 1881–1883 and later
litigation); PASSER, THE ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERS, supra note 42, at 151–59
(describing the beginning of patent litigation over the incandescent lamp in
1885 and its continuation for many years); Consol. Elec. Light Co. v.
McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465 (1895) (invalidating a Sawyer-Man patent
under which any light bulb with a filament of carbonized vegetable matter
would have been deemed infringing).
126. Consolidated Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 40 F. 21, 28–29
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1889), aff’d, 159 U.S. 465 (1895).
127. See generally FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW, supra note 68.
128. Id. at 3.
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has never before been described, in order to compare it in the
future to other technologies that do not yet exist.129 “Taken
together, this set of circumstances ensures that a patent could
never grant a definitive and clearly bounded set of rights.”130
Feldman concludes that a patent must be understood not as a
clear marking of the “metes and bounds” of one party’s
intellectual property, but rather as an invitation to bargain with
others over the scope and value of the patent rights.131 In the end,
“the extent of the rights cannot truly be known until the day that
the patent expires.”132 Keeping Edison’s experience in mind, we
might also characterize this inherent uncertainty of patent claims
as not just “an invitation to bargain,” but also as an invitation to
litigate.
Because of problems of evidence, indeterminate claim
language, and shifting standards of legal interpretation, the
nature of the competition in a patent race may be much less
objective and meritocratic than the metaphor initially suggests.
Are inventive races meaningfully similar to the 100-meter dash
or a presidential primary? Or are they more like an Olympic
gymnastics competition, in which the American and Soviet judges
may arrive at wildly different conclusions?133 Whether we view
the patent race as a fair and objective contest or not has great
implications for the degree of confidence we place in the patent
system to pick winners and losers, and therefore, to structure the
proper incentives for technological innovation. Lemley’s patent
racing model lessens the power of the myth that inventions
appear out of thin air, and would not have existed but for the
contributions of the credited inventor, a misperception that too
easily favors very strong patent rights. Without great caution,
however, the patent racing model might replace an old myth with
a new one: that of the patent race as a fair and clean contest.
Patent law on the ground is not so neat and tidy.

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 5.
133. After all, American courts picked Thomas Edison, and British courts
picked Joseph Swan.
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The patent racing model also carries a second risk: it tells
only part of the story and leaves out what might be the most
important part, from the perspective of innovation. Patent racing
theory best describes the early stages of development of a new
technology. In the latter stages of commercialization,
improvement, and diffusion of that technology, the nature of the
competition shifts very distinctively.134 This latter dynamic,
which I term “patent warfare,” can also be understood as a
contest or game. But its nature is quite different from the patent
race described by Lemley, and its implications for innovation are
not nearly so positive. A look at what happens next in the story of
the light bulb—after the technology was perfected enough for
Edison and others to begin to commercialize it—will make this
point crystal clear.
IV. Learning from the Light Bulb
A. From Patent Racing to Patent War
In Part III, the early contest to develop and bring to market
an incandescent light bulb was used to test the theory of patent
racing. The history largely supports the theory of patent racing,
albeit with skepticism as to any implication of a clear finish line.
After the light bulb came to market, however, the dynamics of the
competition among inventive teams shifted dramatically. Here,
the more accurate metaphor is neither a sprint nor a marathon,
but the strategic board game Risk.135 In this game, the board
resembles a map of the world, with varying territories. In the
early stages of the game, players amass tokens representing
armies and position them strategically on the board to fortify their
positions. Eventually, the game shifts into attack mode, as
134. I am indebted to Gaia Bernstein for highlighting an important
distinction between innovation and diffusion of new technologies. See, e.g.,
Bernstein, supra note 16, at 2290–91 (distinguishing the innovation and
diffusion stages of a technology’s introduction and arguing that intellectual
property law neglects the latter).
135. See Risk (game), WIKIPEDIA, (Sept. 14, 2012, 4:45 PM), https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_(game) (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (offering a full
description of the game of Risk) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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players vie to conquer each other’s territories. Ultimately, one
party pushes out all the competitors and achieves the goal of the
game: world domination.
Similarly, industrial contenders may spend years amassing a
patent portfolio and income streams that will eventually fund
their litigation war chest. At a certain point, when one party
thinks it is the right amount ahead, it begins to close in on its
opponents. Both in Risk and in patent warfare, the strategic
campaigner should begin by confronting its weakest competitors
because those victories will be easiest. The victor may also amass
strength by absorbing the assets—patent portfolio and market
share—of the vanquished foe. Finally, the two strongest
competitors confront each other, as the Edison and Westinghouse
companies faced off in the litigation that reached the Supreme
Court in the Incandescent Lamp Patent case.
To paraphrase the classical military theorist Clausewitz:
Patent litigation is the continuation of business strategy by other
means.136 Patent racing is helpful for understanding how patents
impact innovation leading up to the patent filing. But the longterm impact of patent law on industrial competition requires a
very different metaphor. Patents acquired in the racing stage
become pawns in a battle to achieve market dominance and
secure competitive position. Contrary to the metaphor of the race,
it is not who is first to the patent office that wins, but who is last
left standing at the end of litigation.
In the early days of the light bulb’s commercial use, patents
proliferated but did not pose a barrier to competition. Economic
historian Harold C. Passer points out that Edison had a
significant share of the market early on, but not anything like
exclusive control.137 In Passer’s words: “In the beginning, very
little attention was paid to patents, and manufacturers could
make the entire incandescent system. The dynamo could not be
136. See CARL PHILIPP GOTTFRIED VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael
Howard & Peter Paret eds., trans., Princeton University Press 1976) (“War
is . . . a continuation of political activity by other means.”). Carl Philipp
Gottfried von Clausewitz was a Prussian General and writer in military theory.
See id. at 3–25 (describing the background and history of Carl Philipp Gottfried
von Clausewitz).
137. See PASSER, THE ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERS, supra note 42, at 206
(“Of the 250,000 [incandescent lights] in use in 1885, over 200,000 were Edison
lights on Edison equipment.”).
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patented, and lamp patents were not respected.”138 By 1890,
however, Edison’s market share had fallen to less than half.139
Patent warfare was crucial to reversing that trend and securing
Edison’s control of the light-bulb market. In the first year of
litigation, Edison’s company was involved in nearly one hundred
patent disputes, including administrative proceedings.140
Between 1885 and 1895, more than twenty major opinions were
issued in U.S. cases disputing Edison’s claims to control of the
incandescent light bulb.141 By 1901, Edison’s side had spent about
$2,000,000 on more than two-hundred lawsuits related to its
lighting patents.142 The Sawyer–Man infringement suit against
Edison alone generated more than 5,000 pages of documents, not
including the patent application and interference stages.143 Nor
was the litigation confined to the American shores. Foreign
patents and litigation, especially in Great Britain and in
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Israel, Claim the Earth, supra note 2, at 20.
141. See, e.g., Edison Elec. Light Co. v. Waring Elec. Co., 59 F. 358 (C.C.D.
Conn. 1894) (granting preliminary injunction against infringement of Edison
Patent No. 223,898), aff’d, 69 F. 645 (2d Cir. 1894) (per curiam); Edison Elec.
Co. v. Boston Incandescent Lamp Co., 62 F. 397 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894) (granting
preliminary injunction against infringement of Edison Patent No. 223,898);
Edison Elec. Co. v. Bos. Incandescent Lamp Co., 62 F. 397 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894)
(granting preliminary injunction against infringement of Edison Patent No.
223,898); Edison Elec. Light Co. v. Beacon Vacuum Pump & Elec. Co., 54 F. 678
(C.C.D. Mass. 1893) (granting preliminary injunction against infringement of
Edison Patent); Edison Elec. Light Co. v. Elec. Mfg. Co., 57 F. 616 (C.C.E.D.
Wis. 1893) (upholding the validity of Edison Patent No. 223,898 and finding
infringement), aff’d, 61 F. 834 (7th Cir. 1894); Edison Elec. Light Co. v. U.S.
Elec. Lighting Co., 52 F. 300 (2d Cir. 1892) (upholding the validity of Edison
Patent No. 223,898 and finding infringement), decree modified sub. nom. Edison
Elec. Light Co. v. Sawyer–Man Elec. Lighting Co., 53 F. 592 (2d Cir. 1982);
Edison Elec. Light Co. v. Westinghouse, 40 F. 666 (C.C.D.N.J. 1889) (upholding
the validity of Edison Patent No. 264,642 and finding infringement); Consol.
Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 40 F. 21 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1889)
(invalidating Sawyer–Man Patent No. 317,676, erroneously referred to in the
opinion as No. 317,076), aff’d, 159 U.S. 465 (1895). Paul Israel estimates Edison
was involved in nearly 100 patent disputes involving electric light by 1885.
Israel, Claim the Earth, supra note 2, at 20.
142. BRIGHT, supra note 2, at 136–37.
143. See BAZERMAN, supra note 81, at 239–40 (“The conflict . . . moved to the
courts, where it produced eight volumes of documents totaling more than 5000
pages.”).
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Germany, formed an important part of Edison’s transnational
litigation strategy.
As companies in the field of incandescent light technology
negotiated cross-licensing deals and takeovers, patents on many
aspects of the electrical lighting system played important
roles.144 But in U.S. litigation one of Edison’s many patents on
the light bulb would ultimately play the most important role.
Issued on January 27, 1880, U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (’898
Patent) recognized Thomas Alva Edison’s “improvement in
electric lamps,” including a claim on “[a]n electric lamp for
giving light by incandescence, consisting of a filament of carbon
of high resistance, made as described, and secured to metallic
wires, as set forth.”145 The ’898 Patent was just one among
dozens of patents that Edison sought on the light bulb
technology, and it was not initially clear that it would prove so
central.146 Competitors in the industry strongly doubted the
validity of its claims.147 That changed crucially when a
Pennsylvania court, in the course of invalidating a rival patent
held by Sawyer and Man, and in dicta, gave Edison’s ’898 Patent
a new interpretation so broad as to render virtually every
incandescent light bulb infringing.148 Subsequent litigation
produced a stunning consolidation of the previously very
competitive American electric industry.149 After the Supreme
144. See BRIGHT, supra note 2, at 86. See generally Israel, Claim the Earth,
supra note 2.
145. Thomas Alva Edison, Elec. Lamp, U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Nov.
11, 1879) (issued Jan. 27, 1880). The patent contains three additional
independent claims, which are omitted here for the sake of brevity. Id.
146. See BAZERMAN, supra note 81, at 86–89 (explaining that, despite the
large number of Edison patents, only the ’898 Patent was deemed “crucial”).
147. See PASSER, THE ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERS, supra note 42, at 153–
54.
148. See Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 40 F. 21 (C.C.W.D.
Pa. 1889), aff’d, 159 U.S. 465 (1895) (invalidating the Sawyer–Man Patent);
PASSER, THE ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERS, supra note 42, at 155 (“The meaning
of the decision seemed to be that the Edison patent could be the basis for an
absolute monopoly of incandescent-lamp manufacture in the United States.”);
see also BAZERMAN, supra note 81, at 250–57 (offering an insightful account of
the McKeesport trial).
149. See BRIGHT, supra note 2, at 84–93; see also BAZERMAN, supra note 81,
at 239–40 (explaining that, after the litigation with its industry competition, the
Edison companies and their successor, General Electric, emerged as “the
primary owner of light technology as the industry expanded”).
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Court’s 1895 decision, all U.S. producers either purchased
licenses from General Electric or merged with it.150
Passer’s economic study documents the transformation of the
light bulb market before and after the patent litigation. In the
early years of the electrical industry, he writes:
Patents were not significant in either the product or the
manufacturing process. In these conditions—a standardized
product sold mainly to business firms, relatively free entry,
many buyers, and more than fifteen sellers—the market
closely approached the economist’s concept of pure
competition. The competition was almost entirely in prices,
and these were driven down to cost by the additional supply
from new firms. But these freely competitive conditions did not
prevail for long. The year 1888 marked the end of pure
competition in arc carbons, and 1896 [the year after The
Incandescent Lamp Patent was decided] saw the termination
of pure competition in incandescent lamps.151

By 1897, General Electric was the undisputed leader, and
Westinghouse was its only serious rival.152 The two companies
agreed to a truce in the form of patent cross-licensing and product
pricing agreements.153 Smaller competitors were invited to join
150. See BRIGHT, supra note 2, at 136–37 (explaining that the combination of
“patent victory, consolidations, and patent and marketing agreements” made
Edison the indisputable leader of the domestic incandescent-lamp industry).
151. PASSER, THE ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERS, supra note 42, at 350. Passer
details forces contributing to the demise of competition including both nonpatent and patent factors. Of the latter, he writes:
Patents also influenced competitive conditions. They were a prime
cause of the numerous consolidations and mergers which finally
resulted in only two full-line producers. Furthermore, patents
permitted competition to take place on a system basis instead of with
reference to single items of equipment. Manufacturers could refuse to
allow the use of particular patented apparatus except as a part of a
complete lighting or power system.
Id. at 352.
152. See BRIGHT, supra note 2, at 144 (“In 1987 the General Electric
Company was unquestionably the leader of the American electric-lamp industry.
It had recently entered into a general cross-licensing arrangement with the
Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company, its largest competitor . . . .”).
153. See id. at 12 (“A general patent-licensing arrangement between General
Electric and Westinghouse in 1896 and subsequent specific licenses established
a pattern in the lamp industry which was substantially maintained until
1945.”); see also W. BERNARD CARLSON, INNOVATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS: ELIHU
THOMSON AND THE RISE OF GENERAL ELECTRIC 271–301 (1991).
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the Incandescent Lamp Manufacturers Association, organized by
General Electric. These members agreed to divide up the markets
and avoid price competition.154 The result was that G.E. sold half
of the bulbs in the U.S. market, and the smaller companies
divided the other half.155 These smaller companies, dependent on
G.E. patent licenses for their existence, put no downward
pressure on prices and were discouraged from contributing their
full potential to next-generation innovation.156 In Bright’s words:
“They gave only the appearance of competition.”157 Through
incorporation, patent litigation, licensing deals, and eventually
purchases of stock, by 1910, G.E. controlled 97% of the market.158
Only then could Edison finally rest, his empire secure.
History remembers Edison as a workshop inventor, a
tinkerer—an image established, in no small part, by Edison’s own
efforts. A more accurate historical portrait begins with
recognizing Edison as an entrepreneur and empire builder.159
154. See BRIGHT, supra note 2, at 144 (explaining that General Electric
organized the Incandescent Lamp Manufacturers Association, obtaining the
cooperation of a large proportion of the industry, including six “formerly bitter
rivals,” who joined to avoid intense price competition).
155. See id. (“The members of the association agreed among themselves to
fix lamp prices, both wholesale and retail, to divide business and customers, and
to set terms of sale.”).
156. See id. at 457. (“The role of the licensees was largely passive . . .
add[ing] little to the vitality of the lamp industry; and they aided General
Electric in retaining its hold over the industry. They did not provide any real
downward pressure on prices. They gave only the appearance of competition.”).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 147–48. An antitrust investigation subsequently found
misconduct, but the remedies did not require the company to seriously change
its business model. General Electric would continue to dominate the light bulb
market for decades longer. See id. at 253–56.
159. In an unguarded moment, Edison’s voice was captured on his own
phonograph in an exchange suggesting Edison saw himself as a “hustler.” Stross
tells the story best:
One occasion when Edison cast off the expectations of others in his
middle age was when he met Henry Stanley, of “Dr. Livingston, I
presume” fame, and Stanley’s wife, who had come to visit him at his
laboratory in West Orange, N.J. Edison provided a demonstration of
the phonograph, which Stanley had never heard before. Stanley
asked, in a low voice and slow cadence, “Mr. Edison, if it were
possible for you to hear the voice of any man whose name is known in
the history of the world, whose voice would you prefer to hear?”
“Napoleon’s,” replied Edison without hesitation.
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Among his contemporaries working on the light bulb, Edison had
a unique focus on commercialization of the emerging technology,
rather than merely securing patents.160 Edison was no mere
inventor, but a different breed altogether: the inventorentrepreneur.161 From the beginning, Edison intended not merely
to license his light-bulb patents, but to commercialize the
technology himself; indeed, much of his energies would be
consumed in supervising the rollout of his products in the
marketplace.162 In this way, he had much more in common with
Steve Jobs or Bill Gates than with the average patent seeker.
As an entrepreneur, Edison understood that he would have
to confront his competition in the marketplace sooner or later, no
matter how advantageous his patent portfolio.163 He likely
recognized the business advantages that come with being the first
“No, no,” Stanley said piously, “I should like to hear the voice of our
Savior.”
“Well,” explained Edison, “You know, I like a hustler.”
Randall Stross, Edison the Inventor: Edison the Showman, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2007, at B1. Strictly speaking, Edison’s use of the word “hustler” describes
Napoleon, not himself. But Edison’s selection of Napoleon as the historical voice
he would most like to hear strongly suggests that the inventor considered the
empire-maker a personal role model. In describing Napoleon as a hustler, I
believe Edison was also describing his vision of himself. It was a self-image
successfully conveyed to others. Edison collaborator Francis Jehl would later
celebrate Edison as the Napoleon of the team’s efforts.
160. See PASSER, supra note 42, at 83 (“From the economist’s viewpoint, the
most significant aspect of Edison’s activities in electric lighting was his concern
at every step with economic factors.”); see also HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER,
supra note 60, at 29 (“From the start, he clearly realized . . . that his system
would have to be economically competitive, and thus he conceived of the problem
to be solved by invention as inseparably technical and economic.”).
161. See HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER, supra note 60, at 18–22 (describing
Edison’s work as an inventor-entrepreneur). Harold C. Passer had earlier
written of the engineer-entrepreneur, of which Edison was a leading example.
See PASSER, supra note 42, at 356–60. “Edison was an engineer-entrepreneur on
a full-time basis when he turned to the electric light. He made the move
consciously and chose electric lighting as the best of a number of alternatives.”
Id. at 357.
162. See HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER, supra note 60, at 39–42 (explaining
Edison’s strategic design and location of the Pearl Street Station of the Edison
Electric Illuminating Company in the financial district of New York City).
163. See PASSER, supra note 42, at 83 (“Nearly all of [Edison’s] inventive
activities were directed toward making his system as efficient as possible. If his
system were to be successful . . . it would have to survive the market test that
every product in a free economic system has to meet.”).
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to bring a product to market. Moreover, Edison was not just an
experienced inventor and entrepreneur, he was also an
experienced patent litigator, having participated in patent
disputes related to many of his earlier inventions. Because of this
past experience, Edison likely appreciated how difficult a task the
courts would ultimately face in sorting out the competing patent
claims surrounding incandescent light and realized that the party
with greater market share and greater income would hold an
important strategic advantage in the very expensive process of
litigation.
Perhaps Edison ultimately won the patent war over electric
light because, uniquely among the parties, he understood the true
nature of the contest. Throughout the inventive race to the
marketplace, each patent filing was merely a mile marker in an
ultra-marathon of uncertain length. No one knew at the time of
filing which patent claims would turn out to be key, once the
market and the litigation began to take shape.164 This is not to
say that patents were unimportant. They were stockpiled for the
future, when the competition ultimately shifted from an inventive
race to patent war. This battlefield was the true finish line, and
the competition here took place as much on the dimensions of
litigation and business strategy as on the technical merits. In
retrospect, the initial patent race was not an athletic competition
with a clearly defined finish line, allowing judges to objectively
declare the winner. It was an arms race.165
B. The Current Smartphone Patent War
This Article’s model of patent litigation, as resembling a
game of Risk, was inspired by historical evidence. But the
164. See BRIGHT, supra note 2, at 86 (detailing the situation before the
patent war began, stating that by 1887 the “validity of the patents granted in
1880 had not yet been tested”). See generally FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT
LAW, supra note 68, at 40–74 (suggesting that this tremendous uncertainty as to
future meaning and value at the time a patent is filed and granted is inherent to
the nature of patent law).
165. For a more sophisticated exploration of the “arms race” metaphor in
patent law, see Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex
Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
297, 303–11 (2011)
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metaphor of patent warfare has also recently been used to
describe emerging litigation in the IT industry. According to
competition and antitrust law scholar Michael Carrier, “The
smartphone industry today is characterized by a thicket of
patents and wars based on those patents. Every day brings a new
lawsuit or development between Apple, HTC, Microsoft, Motorola
Mobility (MMI), Nokia, and Samsung.”166 Carrier is neither the
first nor the last to refer to the developing pattern of smartphone
litigation as patent “warfare.”167 Journalists appear to have taken
the cue for this military metaphor from the litigants
themselves.168 As the metaphor suggests, the goal of this patent
litigation is to crush the opponent and force surrender.
Ironically, this new patent war is breaking out in the very
sector of the economy where patents may have played the
smallest role in incentivizing innovation. When the computer
industry first emerged in the 1960s, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) resisted software patent applications
as a matter of policy,169 and computer companies themselves
166. Carrier, supra note 4, at 1.
167. See, e.g., McMillan, supra note 4 (“But in practice, patents are weapons.
Technology companies load up on patents like Cold War nations stockpiling
nuclear bombs, hoarding them for use when an important market is at stake.”);
Oberlander, Stabe & Bernard, supra note 4 (“Patent wars are raging in the
smartphone industry. What began as Apple v. Google Android conflict has
turned into a vast legal quagmire involving everyone from Amazon to ZTE.”);
Vascellaro & Ramstad, supra note 4 (“Chief executives . . . will meet in San
Francisco Monday in a court-directed session aimed at settling their
smartphone patent war. But a deal seems unlikely, people familiar with the
matter and others tracking the battle say.”).
168. Software industry participants long spoke of defensive patenting; more
recently, Steve Jobs famously invoked the metaphor of nuclear war in
threatening a competing phone system. Peter Burrows, Apple Seen Hurting
Shareholders Pursuing Jobs’s Patent War: Tech, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 28, 2011,
12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-28/apple-seen-hurtingshareholders-with-jobs-s-thermonuclear-patent-war-tech.html (last visited Nov.
14, 2012) (“Steve Jobs, the co-founder of Apple (AAPL) Inc., told his biographer
that he’d rather wage ‘thermonuclear war’ with Google Inc. than make deals to
share its technology with the maker of the Android operating system.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
169. See Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent
Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39
EMORY L.J. 1025, 1038–39 (1990) (“It was the [Patent Office] Commission’s
judgment that patent protection for computer program innovations was not
desirable. The Commission’s 1966 report . . . recommended legislation that
expressly excluded computer programs from patent protection.”).

ILLUMINATING INNOVATION

1935

supported this approach.170 Even in the 1990s, some leading
software firms opposed the granting of patents in their field.171
Software engineers also overwhelmingly expressed the view that
patents were unnecessary and potentially harmful in their
field.172 Nevertheless, the patentability of software has now been
firmly established in the United States, and the number of
software patent applications filed and granted has dramatically
increased.173 Europe has been even slower than the U.S. to grant
patent protection to software but is moving in the same
direction.174 It is unclear whether the modern availability of
170. See id. at 1028 n.3 (describing industry input to the presidential
commission in 1966); see also id. at 1143 (providing an overview of the early
legal changes regarding the patentability of software).
171. See James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents 2 (Bos. Univ. Sch.
of Law, Working Paper No. 11-31, 2011), [hereinafter Bessen, Software Patents],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868979 (“Major software firms opposed
software patents through the mid-1990s.” (citing Transcripts of the 1994 USPTO
Software Patents Hearings, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.
uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2012))).
172. See Effy Oz, Acceptable Protection of Software Intellectual Property: A
Survey of Software Developers and Lawyers, 34 INFO. & MGMT. 161, 161–73
(1998); Pamela Samuelson et. al., Developments on the Intellectual Property
Front, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, June 1992, at 33, 38 (stating that the
responses to a 1989 survey taken by software developers suggested that there
was “a significant opposition . . . concerning patent protection for software
innovations”).
173. See James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software
Patents, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 157, 169 (2007) (stating that the
number of patent applications granted per year has grown dramatically, and
now “almost 15% of all patents granted are software patents”); Stuart J.H.
Graham & David C. Mowery, Intellectual Property Protection in the U.S.
Software Industry, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON. 219, 226–47
(Wesley A. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (examining judicial opinions
and the shift to support the use of patents in software); Julie E. Cohen & Mark
A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 7 (2001) (“[S]oftware’s status as patentable subject matter was first
doubted, then grudgingly admitted, and finally embraced.”).
174. The European Patent Convention states that methods of “doing
business[] and programs for computers” are not eligible for patent protection.
European Patent Office [EPO], European Patent Convention art. 52(3), Oct. 5,
1973, 13 I.L.M. 268. That prohibition has been significantly modified, however,
by more recent legal sources. The European Patent Office routinely grants
software patents. See EPO, Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent
Office, Part C, Chapter IV, §§ 2.1, 2.2 (June 2005) (indicating that the
prohibition on the patentability of items under Art. 52(2) should be narrowly
construed); see also Computer Program Product/IBM, T 1173/97-3.5.1 (EPO Bd.
of App. July 1, 1998) (noting that “a computer program product is
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patent protection has produced any greater innovation in the
software industry.175
Even under the newer pro-patenting rules, the prevailing
dynamic of patenting in the software industry was “defensive”—
with companies seeking patent portfolios as leverage to protect
themselves against suits by others.176 Strong patterns of crosslicensing and a “gentleman’s agreement” not to sue kept the
major firms from litigating their patents.177 In this context, it
seemed that the major corporations had relegated patent law to
an incidental role in the industry’s business models. Mobile
telephony was built upon collaborative industry standards
relying on voluntary patent pooling. The Internet was built upon
nonproprietary protocols. These were understood as deliberate
choices made by industry consensus to limit the power of patent
law and thereby avoid its negative consequences.178
Industry insiders and patent scholars alike assumed that the
peace was secured by the logic of mutually assured destruction.
Alex Blumberg and Laura Sydell summed up the conventional

not . . . excluded under all circumstances” under Article 52(2) and (3)). This
leaves it up to each nation’s courts to judge the validity of such patents in
subsequent litigation. For a current overview of U.K. and German case law on
the validity of software patents, see Susan J. Marsnick & Robert E. Thomas,
Drawing a Line in the Patent Subject-Matter Sands: Does Europe Provide a
Solution to the Software and Business Method Patent Problem?, 34 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 227 (2011).
175. See generally Bessen, Software Patents, supra note 171 (drawing on
empirical research to conclude that the spread of software patents has not
produced greater innovation, only greater litigation). It should be noted,
however, that software has long enjoyed copyright protection. The important
difference is that copyright protection does not prevent competitors from
reverse-engineering the same function, so long as they write original code.
176. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 165, at 303–10 (discussing the tendency of
companies in the current software industry to pursue defensive patenting
strategies); see also Baio, supra note 4 (recounting his participation in a
software patenting effort he believed at the time was defensive, only to later
find his firm at the center of offensive use of such patents).
177. Matt Macari, FRANDS Forever: How the Smartphone Industry Turned
a Gentleman’s Agreement into a Full-Scale Patent War, VERGE (Feb. 16, 2012,
4:01 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2012/2/16/2786970/FRAND-smartphoneindustry-apple-motorola-samsung (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
178. See id. (discussing the patent-licensing arrangements in the technology
industry that sought to avoid patent law’s negative impact).
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wisdom of industry insiders and followers when they reported in
2011:
All the big tech companies have started amassing troves of
software patents—not to build anything, but to defend
themselves. If a company’s patent horde is big enough, it can
essentially say to the world “If you try to sue me with your
patents, I’ll sue you with mine.” It’s mutually assured
destruction. But instead of arsenals of nuclear weapons, it’s
arsenals of patents.179

By 2012, however, it became clear that the truce had broken
down. What is less clear as this Article goes to press is what the
consequences of this patent war will turn out to be. Will it indeed
be mutual destruction? Or will one party emerge victorious, and
with what damage to each side? And what will be the collateral
damage to the public interest?
The smartphone patent war might be viewed as simply one
more episode in the inevitable dynamics of economic uncertainty
in a competitive marketplace. We might choose to remain
confident in the legal system to sort things out properly, and in
the markets to rebalance themselves. The lesson of the light-bulb
war, however, cautions against such confidence. If history repeats
itself in the smartphone patent war, we could once again see the
consolidation of an important high-technology industry, with the
attendant decline of competition.180 If one company establishes
dominance in the smartphone sector, it will not only control the
device itself but also have a market-dominant position from
which to influence the markets for related services: mobile
telephony, software, social networking, online advertising, mobile
banking, and online retail. Smartphone dominance could be used
to extract rents from and consolidate those related industries,
subject only to the limits imposed by effective enforcement of
antitrust law.181
179. Alex Blumberg & Laura Sydell, When Patents Attack, NPR (July 22,
2011, 8:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/07/26/138576167/whenpatents-attack (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
180. See supra Part IV.A (noting that the electric industry, following the
patent warfare involving the light bulb, consolidated into General Electric, thus
effectively preventing competition).
181. See Carrier, supra note 4 (discussing the role that antitrust law has
begun to assume in limiting market dominance in the high-technology industry,
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To be sure, the fact that patent warfare led to effective
monopoly in the early electrical industry is no guarantee that the
same result will occur in the smartphone sector. The light bulb
and the smartphone are different technologies, and these
differences may produce different outcomes in the two industries.
It is also possible that reforms in patent and antitrust law since
the turn of the century have lowered the risks for this kind of
patent-precipitated consolidation of a market. Nevertheless, the
very fact that a similar pattern of patent warfare is exhibited in
two very different industries, at two very different points in time,
suggests significant commonalities. Rather than adopt a waitand-see approach when so much may be on the line, what can be
done proactively to reduce the risk of consolidation and loss of
competition in the smartphone industry?
At least one federal judge has already flagged the risk that
patent litigation poses to industry competition and consumer
welfare in the smartphone sector.182 In June 2012, Judge Richard
A. Posner issued a remarkable ruling in a particularly highprofile smartphone patent suit between Apple and Motorola
(which was acquired by Google in August 2011).183 Judge Posner
indicated his intention to dismiss the suit with prejudice without
granting a jury trial, on the grounds that, even if the disputed
patents were valid and infringed, there was insufficient evidence
to support damages, and injunctive relief would be counter to the
public interest.184 This holding may be interpreted as clever
procedural handling by Judge Posner to squash a case in which
one or both parties were attempting to misuse patent law to
damage its competitor company out of proportion to any real
harm done. On the heels of the decision, Judge Posner—acting in
his capacity as a law professor—also initiated a media effort to

both in the United States and in Germany).
182. See Posner, Too Many Patents, supra note 4 (noting the potential risks
of certain patenting tactics).
183. Judge Posner is one of a number of Article III judges specially
designated as volunteers to hear patent disputes at the trial court level, having
received special training in the handling of these complex cases.
184. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2012),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/96427053/Posner-Order, Opinion and
Order of June 7, 2012 (on appeal Fed. Cir.).
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highlight the potential of patent law to damage competition
and innovation, calling for dramatic patent reform.185
The suit before Judge Posner, however, was just one
among many. In August 2012, Judge Lucy Koh presided over a
highly publicized trial brought by Apple in the Northern
District of California.186 The lawsuit targeted Samsung, the
leading manufacturer of smartphones running Android
software, which were increasingly overtaking the Apple iPhone
in popularity.187 After just three days of deliberation, the jury
found Samsung to have infringed Apple’s utility patents,
design patents, and trade dress.188 The jury awarded over $1
185. See, e.g., Posner, Too Many Patents, supra note 4 (discussing the
negative consequences of patent law).
186. Apple Inc., v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL
3627731 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012).
187. Apple had an early advantage in the smartphone market because of
lead-time and network effects. Apple encouraged independent software
developers to produce “apps” that could run on Apple’s iOS system. The
availability of these apps became a major feature driving consumers to purchase
the iPhone. None of the competing smartphone manufacturers commanded
sufficient market penetration to attract similar app development, until Google
introduced the Android operating system. Google widely licensed the Android
software to a number of smartphone manufacturers, including Samsung. The
emergence of the Android platform enabled other manufacturers to effectively
compete with the iPhone. By mid-2011, Android phones were outselling iPhones
more than two-to-one. See IDC, Android and iOS Surge to New Smartphone OS
Record in Second Quarter (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?
containerId=prUS23638712 (last visted Oct. 21, 2012) (reporting Q2 2011
shipments of 50.8 million Android phones and 20.4 million iOS phones) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). By the middle of 2012, however, the
gap had widened; four Android phones were being sold for each iPhone. See id.
(reporting Q2 2012 shipments of 104.8 million Android phones and 26.0 million
iOS phones.) At the time of the trial, Samsung was the leading producer of
Android phones. See id. (“Android’s success in the market can be traced directly
to Samsung, which accounted for 44.0% of all Android phones shipped
[worldwide] in [the second quarter of 2012] and totaled more than the next
seven Android vendors’ volumes combined.”).
188. See Amended Verdict Form, Apple Inc., v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11CV-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Amended Jury Verdict
Form], available at http://cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/1079/Amended%20Jury%
20Verdict.pdf; Dan Levine, Jury Didn’t Want to Let Samsung Off Easy in Apple
Trial: Foreman, REUTERS (Aug. 25, 2012, 3:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/08/25/us-apple-samsung-juror-idUSBRE87O09U20120825 (last visited Nov.
14, 2012) [hereinafter Levine, Apple Trial] (“A nine-member jury found the
Korean company had infringed on several Apple features and design
patents . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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billion in damages.189 Having tested the appeal of their claims
before one jury, Apple has probably gained a stronger hand to
negotiate concessions from other smartphone manufacturers
running the Android system. This case was unique, however, in
that the accused products not only incorporated software features
described by Apple’s utility patents but were also very similar in
external appearance. This latter fact led to infringement claims
based on Apple’s design patents and on a theory of trade dress
dilution.190 The jury was not asked to distinguish the damages it
attributed to each theory of infringement.191 A different result
might thus be reached in another case in which the products were
not similar in external appearance.
The Federal Circuit has also shown an inclination to lower
the stakes of the smartphone patent war by making it
increasingly difficult to block a competitor’s phone on the basis of
a minor software patent. For many years, courts routinely
awarded not only monetary damages but also an injunction
against future sales of the infringing product, whenever the
patent holder prevailed on the merits.192 This created a problem
of “patent holdup,” whereby patents on minor features could be
used to block the sale of an entire product.193 The Supreme
189. See Amended Jury Verdict Form, supra note 188, at 15 (stating the
damages awarded to Apple); Levine, Apple Trial (awarding a jury verdict of
$1.05 billion dollars, which could be tripled because the jury found the company
acted willfully).
190. The San Jose jury concluded that the iPhone trade dress (registered
and unregistered) was famous and was willfully diluted by Samsung’s products.
See Amended Jury Verdict Form, supra note 188, at 10–12, 14.
191. See Amended Jury Verdict Form (asking jurors to answer “yes” or “no”
for whether each accused product violated each patent and the trade dress, and
also “[w]hat is the total dollar amount that Apple is entitled to receive from
Samsung on the claims on which you have ruled in favor of Apple?”).
192. See, e.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc, 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (granting an injunction and restating the “general rule that courts
will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent
exceptional circumstances”), rev’d, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
193. See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdups, the ITC, and
the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 105–06 (forthcoming Nov. 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2022168
In a common patent infringement case, for example, the patent covers
a small part of a larger product, and the defendant infringes it
inadvertently. If an interoperability standard covers the infringing
feature, removing the feature may disable the product. Eliminating a
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Court’s 2006 decision in Ebay v. MercExchange194 questioned the
routine grant of injunctive relief in patent cases and called for a
more demanding inquiry into the equities of each case.195 In the
wake of this case, lower courts have been more inclined to deny
injunctive relief, even where a patent holder seems likely to
prevail on the merits.
In the Apple–Samsung case described above, Judge Koh
refused to enjoin the sale of four Samsung products in December
2011, despite holding that Apple was likely to prevail in proving
patent infringement.196 Koh reasoned that Apple had failed to
prove a sufficient “nexus” between the patent Samsung infringed
and the alleged harm of lost iPhone sales.197 On appeal, the
big product from the market because of a small patent harms
consumers, and blocking a large number of lawful components and
features from the market along with the infringing one distorts
competition.
In another common situation, a patent holder sues a large number of
companies, threatening to hobble an entire industry. An injunction
would exclude many participants from the marketplace and
dramatically reduce competition.
In both these scenarios, the harm to consumers and competition from
an exclusion order is greater than the contribution made by the
individual infringing component.
194. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
195. See id. at 393–94 (holding that injunctive relief was inappropriate
based on a case-specific analysis of four equitable factors); see also Winter v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (applying the
MercExchange standard to deny a preliminary injunction in a case not related to
patent law).
196. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2011 WL
7036077, at *40 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“For the forgoing reasons, the Court DENIES
Apple’s motion to preliminarily enjoin the sale in the United States of the
Samsung Infuse 4G, the Samsung Galaxy S 4G, the Samsung Tab 10.1, and the
Droid Charge phone.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 678 F.3d 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
197. See id. at *20–21, *39–40. Judge Koh explained her decision with
reference to the “leveraging” reasoning offered in eBay:
Even though Apple has shown Samsung’s products likely infringe
Apple’s valid ’381 patent, and that Apple and Samsung compete in
the same market for new smartphone customers and for tablet
computer consumers, Apple has offered no evidence that Samsung’s
infringement of the ’381 patent is likely to cause irreparable
harm. . . . Indeed, Apple has failed to establish a relationship between
any alleged loss of market share, customers, or goodwill, and the
infringement of the ’381 patent.
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Federal Circuit endorsed Koh’s articulation and application of a
nexus requirement.198 Following this guidance, Judge Koh again
conducted a nexus analysis in June 2012, in the second case
brought by Apple against Samsung in her court.199 This time, Koh
found the nexus requirement to be satisfied and granted an
injunction barring sales of Samsung’s Galaxy Nexus
smartphone.200 Judge Koh held that Apple had met its burden of
proof with respect to one particularly important patent, U.S.

Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in eBay, instructed courts
to be cognizant of the nature of the patent being enforced and the
economic function of the patent holder when applying the equitable
factors:
When the patented invention is but a small component of the product
the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages
may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an
injunction may not serve the public interest.
The Court finds this argument persuasive. While Apple undoubtedly
uses the patent and produces goods in the same market, Apple has
neither alleged, nor established, that the ’381 patent is either
necessary to, or a core functionality of, the products that it seeks to
enjoin. Nor has Apple shown that consumers’ purchasing decisions
are based on the existence of a snap back feature protected by the
’381 patent.
Id. at *39–40 (citations omitted).
198. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2012)
We hold that the district court was correct to require a showing of
some causal nexus between Samsung’s infringement and the alleged
harm to Apple as part of the showing of irreparable harm. To show
irreparable harm, it is necessary to show that the infringement
caused harm in the first place. Sales lost to an infringing product
cannot irreparably harm a patentee if consumers buy that product for
reasons other than the patented feature. If the patented feature does
not drive the demand for the product, sales would be lost even if the
offending feature were absent from the accused product. Thus, a
likelihood of irreparable harm cannot be shown if sales would be lost
regardless of the infringing conduct.
199. See Apple Inc., v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2012 WL
257203 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2012), rev’d, No. 2012-1507, 2012 WL 4820601 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
200. See id. The “Nexus” phone was thus saved by the “nexus” requirement.
This may not be a complete linguistic coincidence. Although other courts had
previously articulated this concept, Judge Koh appears to be the first to use the
term “nexus” to describe it.
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Patent No. 8,086,604, which was related to the iPhone’s “Siri”
personal assistant feature.201
In October 2012, however, the Federal Circuit ruled on
appeal that the Galaxy Nexus injunction was improperly
granted.202 The Federal Circuit insisted that the nexus
requirement be applied even more stringently. According to the
circuit-level opinion, Apple had failed to demonstrate that the
infringement drove consumer demand for the Galaxy Nexus
because Samsung’s feature incorporating the ‘604 patent was not
among the top five reasons that consumers choose that phone.203
Articulated in this way, the Federal Circuit’s “causal nexus”
standard seems extremely difficult to satisfy, at least in the
context of smartphones. This ruling may signal the end of the
injunction as a weapon in the smartphone patent war.
Even as the Federal Circuit has made it more difficult to
block a competitor’s phone through the courts, however, litigants
are looking to other venues. Colleen Chien and Mark Lemley
point out that patent holders are increasingly circumventing the
new higher standards for injunctive relief by taking their cases to
the International Trade Commission (ITC) instead.204 The ITC is
a U.S. administrative agency that is empowered to issue
“exclusion orders” blocking products it deems to be infringing
from entering the U.S., achieving the same result as an
injunction. According to Chien and Lemley, the ITC is
increasingly the battleground of choice in the smartphone patent
war and continues to be liberal in granting exclusion orders.205
Given the myriad of patents relevant to smartphone
technology, an aggressive and persistent litigator can launch
201. See id. at *55–56.
202. See Apple Inc., v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2012-1507, 2012 WL
4820601 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
203. See id. at *10–11 (“Apple’s own survey evidence shows that unified
search is not one of the top five reasons consumers select Android smartphones.
In this light, the causal link between the alleged infringement and consumer
demand for the Galaxy Nexus is too tenuous to support a finding of irreparable
harm.”).
204. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 193, at 102–03. (“[T]he ITC is busier
with patent cases than it ever has been before.”).
205. See id. at n.15 (citing individual cases involving Apple, Samsung, Sony,
LG, HTC, Motorola, Nokia, and RIM). “In 2011, every major smartphone maker
was embroiled in an ITC dispute.” Id. at 104.
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many volleys and advance through attrition. Edison’s own
litigation campaign met with modest success for many years,
until he achieved a surprising victory in a German court, which
then formed the basis for the next round of decisive litigation in
the U.S. Similarly, the smartphone patent war is now being
waged on many fronts, with suits active in England, Germany,
South Korea, Japan, and elsewhere, and is far from over.206
C. Implications for Innovation
Supplementing the theory of patent racing with a theory of
patent warfare casts a more skeptical light on the innovation
hypothesis. The initial fervor to claim patent rights in the early
electrical industry stimulated greater investment in firstgeneration research.207 This is consistent with the predictions of
Lemley’s patent racing theory.208 Over the long term, however,
patent protection also led to a dramatic reduction of competition
in the electrical industry.209 As the industry matured, the more
well-funded companies used patent warfare to target and
eliminate their competition.210 Regardless of who emerges as the
winner in Risk, the endgame is always the same: one party
controls the entire board. In the real-life version, there may also
be a détente where two parties agree to tolerate each other in
separate spheres—as General Electric and Westinghouse divided
the U.S. and British markets. Either way, the very competition
that stimulated faster innovation during the racing stage is
ultimately brought to an end.

206. See Carrier, supra note 4, at 3 (noting the importance of the German
courts with respect to patent law).
207. See supra Part III.B (supporting the proposition that the initial fervor
to claim patent rights stimulated substantial investment in first-generation
research).
208. See supra Part III.A–B (noting Lemley’s predictions and discussing how
the historical record of the beginnings of light bulb inventing is consistent with
Lemley’s predictions).
209. See supra Part IV.A (noting the negative effects of patent law on
industry research).
210. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the tactics of well-funded companies to
use patent litigation to eliminate competition).
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Patent warfare may harm innovation in at least three ways.
First, litigation is a resource-intensive distraction of capital and
human resources. The Edison interests, for example, spent $2
million on litigation211 at a time when the company’s net worth
was only $12 million.212 These financial resources, as well as
Edison’s own talents, might otherwise have been invested in
improving the product and delivering it more efficiently to
consumers. Second, a litigious environment can discourage the
risk-taking of investing in next-generation innovation because
would-be innovators fear they will be legally prevented from
producing the newer technology. Third, as the pressure to stay
one step ahead of the competition is eased, the competitive
motivation to keep improving the technology is diminished.
Bright notes this dynamic in the early electrical industry: as the
light bulb litigation heated up, technological innovation
dimmed.213 In the aftermath of patent warfare, General Electric
was able to prevent any other light bulb manufacturer from
exerting downward pressure on prices; the only real competitive
pressure came from further advances in the substitute technology
of gas lighting.214 This is not to say that light bulb innovation
ground to a halt. General Electric still had profit-based incentives
to cut its own production costs by introducing more efficient
technological improvements.215 But the company no longer risked
211. See BRIGHT, supra note 2, at 86 (estimating that “[b]etween 1885 and
1901 the Edison company and its successors spent about $2,000,000 on well over
two hundred infringement suits under its lamp and lighting patents”).
Defendants of the lawsuits probably had to spend nearly the same amount.
212. See id. (“The final step in the transition of the Edison companies from
domination by Thomas A. Edison to domination by financiers took place in 1889
[merging] the remaining separate Edison development and manufacturing
companies into the Edison General Electric Light Company. . . . The new
company had a capitalization of $12,000,000 . . . .”).
213. See id. at 138 (indicating that “[t]he lengthy and expensive patent
struggle in the lamp industry from 1885 to 1894 was a serious damper on
progress in lamp design, although process improvement continued”).
214. See id. at 457 (discussing the realities surround General Electric’s
dominance, including the volume of the market controlled by General Electric,
the lack of developmental work available to competitors, and the generally
passive role licensees).
215. See id. at 455 (noting that General Electric “possessed immense ability
to achieve technological advances . . . [and] . . . had strong incentives to make
improvements in lamp design and production methods”).
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being overtaken by a competitor if it lagged behind in the
innovative endeavor. As competition in the electric industry
slowed and prices for equipment and service remained high,
millions of Americans literally waited in the dark. More than a
half-century would pass after Thomas Edison filed his first
patents before electric light would find its way into the average
American home.
Importantly, the potential long-term damage to nextgeneration innovation is not limited to the twenty years of the
modern patent term. By the time first-generation patents become
obsolete, newer patents already exist to take their place. When
Edison’s patents expired, General Electric was able to use newer
ones to extend its dominance.216 The result in the case of the light
bulb was that General Electric would control the electric lighting
industry for many decades longer.217 Even as Arthur A. Bright
published his thesis on the electric-lamp industry in 1949,
General Electric’s monopolization of the electric lighting industry
remained a problem. Once patent warfare produces the
consolidation of an industry, reintroducing competition is not a
simple matter.
This anticompetitive endgame is my central concern with the
use of patent racing theory as a new justification for patent
protection. The racing metaphor paints a picture of objectivity
and fair competition. In the case of the light bulb, however, the
race was merely a prelude to the war. Patents almost certainly
add fervor to inventive races at a certain stage of research and
development. But at a later stage, patents also become weapons
that competitors use to threaten and dominate their competition,
long before the public policy goal of wide diffusion of the new
technology has been fully attained. This may also have the
perverse effect of ultimately limiting next-generation innovation.
In the end, enthusiasm for the competitive advantages of races
may be an argument against patent protection, rather than an
argument in its favor.
216. See id. at 458 (noting General Electric’s ability to exert control over the
patent market).
217. See id. at 458–60 (noting General Electric’s ability to exert control until
World War II “with the aid of a strong patent position, commercial and technical
aggressiveness, strong control over lamp parts and machinery, extensive
advertising, and good public relations”).
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The story of the light bulb thus turns out to be a cautionary
tale against reliance on the innovation assumption. The
downsides of patent protection are probably systematically
underappreciated. Partly this has to do with our methodology of
study. Empirical study of recent fields of technology is best at
highlighting the initial, short-term impacts of patent protection.
These include assistance in recruiting capital to fund research
and product development, and in outsourcing production chains—
both of which are positives for innovation. Only historical study
can reveal the longer-term impacts that patent litigation
produces on an industry. These may be systematically more
negative as patents become weapons in attempts to monopolize a
field.218 Further research is needed to determine whether patent
wars are typical or exceptional features of technological
development in the shadow of patent law, identify what factors
motivate different outcomes in patent wars, and clarify the
impact of industrial consolidation on next-generation innovation
as well as diffusion.
V. Conclusion
Although patent law is founded on the assumption that
patent protection encourages innovation, there is little empirical
support available to test this “innovation hypothesis.” This
Article has argued that historical case studies can offer a stronger
empirical basis for patent scholarship by illuminating the true
impact of patent law on innovation throughout the life of a patent
term. The present case study demonstrates this potential, both by
suggesting refinements to one theory of patent racing, and by
proposing a new theory of patent warfare resembling the board
game Risk. Patent warfare transformed the electrical industry at
the close of the nineteenth century and has now erupted in the
smartphone sector. The case study of the light bulb shows that
patent law can have both positive and negative impacts on
technological innovation, and we ignore the complexity of these
dynamics at our own peril.
218. See supra Part II.B (noting case studies of patenting that support the
proposition that patent law harms industry and innovation).

